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THE JUVENILE COURT PROCESS: A STUDY
OF THREE NEW JERSEY COUNTIES
RICHARD H. CHUSED*
INTRODUCTION
The entrance of the Supreme Court into the juvenile justice process'
led many to hope for a massive change in the operation of the "crimi-
nal courts" of the young. However, the actual impact of Gault upon
the juvenile justice process has often been slow in maturing,2 and even
if the rights conferred specifically by Gault3 were implemented in full,
a multitude of problems would remain. Pre-trial procedures have
hardly been touched by litigation4 and post-trial treatment is only be-
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Newark. The
author would like to express special appreciation to those law students who made this
study possible by performing much dreary work, gathering data and constantly raising
new insights into the operations of the courts in which they worked as researchers and
student-lawyers during the 1970-71 academic year. Thanks go to Edward Kopelson,
J.D. 1972, Joyce Usiskin, J.D. 1971, Douglass Wistendahl, J.D. 1972, Patricia Weiss,
J.D. 1972, Sharon Laufer, J.D. 1972, and John Ratliff, J.D. 1971. The problems of
data gathering and computer programming were also eased by the assistance of Kenneth
C. Stevenson, then Lecturer in Social Work, Rutgers University, and now Instructor in
Sociology and Director of the Urban Sociology Field Research Program at Drew Uni-
versity, Madison, New Jersey. In addition, special thanks are due to Ms. Florence
Peskoe, lately of the Administrative Office of the Courts of the State of New Jersey,
and now Clerk of the New Jersey Supreme Court, who so graciously aided the author in
his relationship with the Administrative Office. The author is also grateful to Mr.
Edward B. McConnell, Director of the Administrative Office, for his cooperation. Fi-
nally, the willingness of persons noted later to sit and talk, often at great length, with the
author or his students is appreciated.
1. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). But see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971).
2. Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, In Search of Juvenile Justice-Gault and Its
Implementation, 3 L. & Soc'Y REV. 491 (1969); Platt, Schechter & Tiffany, In Defense
of Youth: A Case of the Public Defender in Juvenile Court, 43 IND. L.J. 619 (1968).
3. Gault requires that juveniles charged with delinquency be notified of the charges
against them and be given the opportunity to confront their adverse witnesses. Gault
also provides that juveniles may not be compelled to incriminate themselves and that
counsel must be provided in delinquency hearings which may result in institutional com-
mitments. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
4. See Conover v. Montemuro, 304 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (complaint
alleging arbitrary screening of juveniles by court intake personnel states cause of ac-
tion); In re Baltimore Detention Center (Baltimore City Ct., Aug. 2, 1971) 5 Clear-
inghouse Rev. 550 (1972) (use of city jail for detention of juveniles ended). Several
courts have issued opinions indicating a willingness to restrain the use of pretrial de-
tention. See, e.g., Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Fulwood v.
Stone, 394 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
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ginning to be viewed by the courts as a significant issue. Further-
more, litigation displays only a part of the philosophical conflicts now
raging in juvenile courts. A lengthy history of the "parens patriae"
handling of juveniles often presents very difficult problems for an ad-
versarial minded attorney appearing in juvenile court for the first time.'
To aid in evaluating the scope and depth of problems in the juvenile
justice system, a study was begun of three county juvenile courts in the
fall of 1970.7  The study's primary focus was upon the routing of cases
through various procedural channels by intake personnel in the New
Jersey courts' juvenile justice process. This area was of special inter-
est for two reasons. First, after Gault was decided, the New Jersey
court rules were altered to create two "calendars" in juvenile court, one
Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Poe v. State, 487 P.2d 47
(Alas. 1971).
See also Ferster & Courtless, The Intake Process in the Affluent County Juvenile
Court, 22 HASTINGS L. REV. 1127 (1971); Ferster & Courtless, The Beginning of Juven-
ile Justice, Police Practices and the Juvenile Offender, 22 VAND. L. REV. 567 (1969);
Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, Unofficial Delinquents: Juvenile Court Intake, 55 IoWA
L. REV. 864 (1970); Ferster, Snethen and Courtless, Juvenile Detention: Protection,
Prevention or Punishment?, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 161 (1969); Gendy, The Exercise of
Discretion by the Police as a Decision-Making Process in the Disposition of Juvenile
Offenders, 8 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 329 (1970); Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to In-
voke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice,
69 YALE L.J. 549 (1960); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and
Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1966); Note, Informal Disposition of
Delinquency Cases: Survey and Comparison of Court Delegation of Decision-Making,
1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 258.
5. In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (consideration of release order
should psychiatric care not be provided juvenile). Some courts have restrained the
use of adult institutions when juveniles are involved. Kautter v. Reid, 183 F. Supp.
352 (D.D.C. 1960); United States ex rel. Stinnett v. Hegstrom, 178 F. Supp. 17 (D.
Conn. 1959); White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954); State ex rel. Londer-
holm v. Owens, 197 Kan. 212, 416 P.2d 259 (1966); In re Rich, 125 Vt. 373, 216 A.2d
266 (1966); State ex rel. McGilton v. Adams, 143 W. Va. 325, 102 S.E.2d 145
(1958). See also State ex rel. Edwards v. McCauley, 50 Wis. 2d 597, 184 N.W.2d 908
(1971). But see Wilson v. Coughlin, 259 Iowa 1163, 147 N.W.2d 175 (1966); Shone v.
State, 237 A.2d 412 (Me., 1968). Some restrictions have been placed on sentences
which are longer for juveniles than for adults convicted for the same behavior. In re
Wilson, 438 Pa. 425, 264 A.2d 614 (1970). See also State in the Interest of K.V.N.,
112 N.J. Super. 544, 271 A.2d 921 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1970), affd, 116 N.J. Super.
580, 283 A.2d 337 (App. Div. 1971). But see Brisco v. United States, 368 F.2d 214
(3d Cir. 1966) and cases cited therein; People v. Cavanaugh, 234 Cal. App. 2d 316,
44 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1969); In re Juvenile, 129 Vt. 185, 274 A.2d 506 (1970). See Pirsig, The Con-
stitutional Validity of Confining Disruptive Delinquents in Penal Institutions, 54 MINN.
L. REv. 101 (1969); Note, Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Correctional Institutions,
1966 Wis. L. REv. 866.
6. See Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, The Juvenile Justice System: In Search of
the Role of Counsel, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 375 (1971); Platt, The Rise of the Child
Saving Movement: A Study in Social Policy and Correctional Reform, 381 ANNALS 21
(1969); Platt, Schechter & Tiffany, In Defense of Youth: A Case of the Public De-
fender in Juvenile Court, 43 IND. L.J. 619 (1968).
7. For a description of the study areas see section II, infra.
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
"formal" where the full panoply of Gault rights were required because
of the possibility of institutional commitment, and one "informal"
where counsel was not required. s Second, New Jersey court personnel
in most counties do not exercise any discretion to dismiss complaints
informally as do intake officers in many states.9 The result is that the
calendaring devices made available to the New Jersey juvenile courts
have become the only mechanism for exercise of court discretion in
channeling complaints.
What follows is an analysis of the case and statutory law relevant to
this study, a description of the study and the data obtained, an analysis
of the data, and a series of recommendations for change in the New
Jersey court process. Special attention is paid to detention practices,
the impact of detention upon calendaring, the nature of the calendar-
ing and adjudication processes, and the resulting dispositions.
I. CASE AND STATUTORY LAW
A. The New Jersey Delinquency Statute
The New Jersey delinquency statute0 provides a very broad jurisdic-
tional grant to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts." Delin-
quency is defined to include all activity committed by children,"2 which
would be criminal behavior for adults,"8 as well as behavior variously
described as habitual vagrancy, incorrigibility, immorality, knowingly
associating with thieves or vicious or immoral persons, growing up in
idleness or delinquency, idly roaming the streets at night, habitual tru-
ancy from school, and deportment endangering the morals, health, or
8. N.J.R. 5:9-1(c).
9. New Jersey statutes are silent on this matter. A pilot project to channel
cases out of the court system at the intake level does exist in Morris County. Compare
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-1 et seq. (1952), as amended N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-1 et seq.
(Supp. 1972) with authorities cited in note 4 supra.
10. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-1 et seq. (1952), as amended N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:
4-1 et seq. (Supp. 1972). The New Jersey State Bar Association has proposed a new
juvenile code for the state. As of this writing, it has not passed the legislature.
11. In New Jersey, juvenile courts are part of the county court system. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-3 et seq. (1952), as amended N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-3 et seq.
(Supp. 1972). Municipal police departments refer their cases to the juvenile court of
their county. Most counties have centralized detention and court facilities. However,
municipalities each handle their case loads differently. Most of the larger towns and
cities have special bureaus within their police departments to handle juvenile cases.
12. Generally, "children" within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court consist of
those under the age of 18 years. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-14 (Supp. 1972). Cases of
a "heinous nature," or cases where a 16 or 17 year old person demands a jury trial may
be referred to county prosecutors. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-15 (1952).
13. Delinquency includes "any act which when committed by a person of the age
of 18 years or over would constitute" a violation of a municipal ordinance or a state
criminal or disorderly persons statute, or which would constitute an act "for which he
could be prosecuted in the method partaking of the nature of a, criminal action."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-14(1) (Supp. 1972).
[Vol. 26
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general welfare of a child.14  Defining delinquency to include activity
which is not criminal for adults, labeled juvenile status offenses in this
study, is a common practice in this country.' Attacks on this type of
broad definition of delinquency have met with limited success."
In State v. L. N.17 two sections of New Jersey's statute defining delin-
quency to include "growing up in idleness or delinquency" and "de-
portment endangering the morals, health or general welfare,"' 8 were
upheld despite vagueness challenges. The juvenile, L. N., had been
adjudicated a delinquent under these sections for sniffing carbona, ac-
tivity not then proscribed by the adult criminal codes in New Jersey.
In affirming the adjudication, the court said:
We find nothing in Gault which would justify our setting at naught the
Legislature's delineation of conduct on the part of juveniles which, be-
cause of its threat to the child's welfare or to society, would constitute
juvenile delinquency, by reason of its vagueness ...
The philosophy of our juvenile court system is aimed at rehabilitation
through reformation and education in order to restore a delinquent
youth to a position of responsible citizenship. (Citations omitted)
14. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-14(2) (Supp. 1972).
15. Even the revised code proposed by the New Jersey Bar Association permits the
juvenile court to retain jurisdiction over such offenders. A new category of offender,
called persons in need of supervision (PINS), would be created to include:
1. A juvenile who is habitually disobedient to the lawful commands of his parent
or guardian when such disobedience makes him ungovernable or incorrigible.
2. A juvenile who is habitually and voluntarily truant, or
3. A juvenile who has committed an offense applicable only to juveniles.
NEW JERSEY STATE BAR Ass'N, PROPOSED JUV. CODE FOR NEW JERSEY § 2A:4-45(a)
(June 1972) (unpublished report in Rutgers Law School Library) [hereinafter cited as
PROPOSED CODE]. PINS would not be detainable, except in children's shelters, or
commitable to correctional institutions.
See also SELLIN AND WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY 71-86 (1964);
SUSSMAN, LAW OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 21-22 (1959); WHEELER AND COTTRELL,
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL (1966). Some states have
attempted to reduce the coverage of their juvenile codes. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE §§ 601, 602 (Deering Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-2, 705-2
(Smith-Hurd 1972).
16. Commonwealth v. Brasher, 270 N.E.2d 389 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1971) (challenge
to statute making a "stubborn child" delinquent fails); E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225
(Tex. Civ. App. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970) (vagueness challenge to
statute defining a delinquent as one who "habitually so comports himself as to injure
or endanger the morals or health of himself or others" fails). See also In re S, 12
Cal. App. 2d 1124, 91 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1971). There is a ray of hope. See Gesicki v.
Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Efforts to reduce the impact of such defini-
tions of delinquency by reducing the use of commitment power have met with some
success in New York. In re David W., 28 N.Y.2d 589, 268 N.E.2d 642, 319 N.Y.S.2d
845 (1971); In re Richard K., 35 App. Div. 2d 716, 314 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1970); In re
Jeanette P., 34 App. Div. 2d 661, 310 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1970); In re Lloyd, 33 App. Div.
2d 385, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1970). See also In re Wilson, 438 Pa. 425, 264 A.2d 614
(1970).
17. 109 N.J. Super. 278, 263 A.2d 150 (App. Div.), alf'd per curiam, 57 N.J. 165,
270 A.2d 409 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1009 (1971).
18. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-14(a),(i),(m) (Supp. 1972).
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In the context of that philosophy we hold that subsections (i) and (m)
of section (2) of N.J.S.A.2A:4-14 do not violate due process by
reason of their asserted vagueness. 19
By its deference to the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice
process, the court avoided grappling with the actual statutory vague-
ness. The clearly circular nature of defining delinquency as growing
up in delinquency in subsection (1) was not discussed. The meaning
of such words as "idleness," "morals," "health," and "general welfare,"
was not given.
The breadth of the juvenile court's jurisdiction creates vast discre-
tionary power in all the agencies which deal with alleged or actual de-
linquents. The court is almost always available as a referral choice to
persons dealing with "problem youngsters." Schools, welfare agencies,
parents, and police will often be able to frame a juvenile court com-
plaint with sufficient allegations to bring their difficult cases before the
court.20 Such openness in referral possibilities was clearly one of the
objects of the statutory scheme." However, the fact that status offend-
ers are placed in the same process as those charged with serious of-
fenses may be subject to substantial criticism. Status offenses are both
broadly defined, and, assuming the definitions carry some meaning,
descriptive of behavior significantly less dangerous to other persons
than most adult criminal charges. Severe treatment of status offenders
as a class should be quite suspect. This study will carefully focus on
how the courts process those persons accused of juvenile status of-
fenses in comparison with those charged with criminal activity. The
study data raises serious questions about the suitability of New Jersey's
broad definitions of delinquency.
B. Procedural Legal Problems: Detention, Hearing, and Sentenc-
ing
1. Detention. The initial procedural contact for an alleged delin-
19. 109 N.J. Super. 278, 286-87, 263 A.2d 150, 154-55 (App. Div.), aff'd per cur-
Jam, 57 N.J. 165, 270 A.2d 409 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1009 (1971).
20. This study did attempt to obtain data from the files as to the nature of persons
or agencies which regularly referred persons to juvenile court for hearings. However,
the data was revealing only in distinguishing parental complaints from others. (See
Tables 53, 54) Further analysis, especially of police files, would be necessary to obtain
a complete picture of the juvenile complaint process. The possibility of legally attack-
ing arbitrary police behavior in referring cases to juvenile court should not be over-
looked. See Conover v. Montemuro, 304 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Pa. 1969). Some work
on police referral practice has been done. See GOLDMAN, THE DIFFERENTIAL SELECTION
OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS FOR COURT APPEARANCE (1963); Piliavin, Irving and Briar,
Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 AM. J. OF Soc. 206 (1964); Wilson, The Police
and the Delinquents in Two Cities, in CONTROLLING DELINQUENTS 9 (Wheeler ed. 1968).




quent is usually the police.2 2  Most of New Jersey's larger municipal
police forces have established divisions or bureaus to handle juvenile
cases. 21 When an officer decides to file an official delinquency com-
plaint, he must also decide whether to release the juvenile pending hear-
ing or take the person to a county detention facility. The decision to
detain is a crucial point in the juvenile process for two reasons. First,
it may have an impact on later phases of the hearing process; this pos-
sibility will be explored later in this study. Second, the decision, made
outside of the normal adult bail procedures, is essentially one of pre-
ventive detention. The scope of any constitutional infirmities in this
process has not been fully settled.
Despite the traditional invisibility of prehearing detention decisions
and the long held belief that bail is not to be set in juvenile cases, 24 a
few courts have begun to establish some restrictions on the scope of de-
tention use in juvenile proceedings. 5 Three types of restrictions have
emerged in the scattering of reported cases. First, in order to detain a
juvenile pending hearing, there must be a judicial determination that
there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the acts
charged. Second, the burden of persuading the court with competent
evidence of the need for continued detention is on the State. Finally,
restrictions have been placed upon the kind and degree of detention
that is permissible.
In Baldwin v. Lewis,20 a juvenile held on suspicion of committing
arson was ordered released due to the state courts' failure to provide the
juvenile with a probable cause hearing. Finding that capture and de-
tention of juveniles constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the
fourth amendment despite statutory declarations that taking children
into custody does not constitute "arrest,"27 the court held that the prob-
able cause requirement of the fourth amendment applies to juveniles held
for delinquency hearings. That holding, together with the state law
22. This is usually true even in cases where other authorities, such as schools, wel-
fare agencies or parents, initiate the action. See note 20 supra.
23. New Jersey court rules provide that juveniles under 16 may not be detained in
police stations. Juveniles over 16 may not be so detained unless they are completely
segregated from adults. N.J.R. 5:8-6(a). This rule, as well as practical need, has led
to the prevalence of youth divisions.
24. See Annot., 160 A.L.R. 287 (1946); Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483
(D.D.C. 1960). In Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the district
court set bail at $3500. In an interesting opinion, the court of appeals found that
other actions could provide an "adequate substitute for bail." The traditional unwill-
ingness to use money bail in juvenile cases seems likely to continue for some time.
Juveniles must almost always rely on parents for bail money which causes special prob-
lems in parental complaint cases. (See Table 54)
25. See cases cited notes 26, 29, 31, 33, 35 inf ra.
26. 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 442 F.2d 29 (7th
Cir. 1971).
27. Id. at 1230.
1973]
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requirement that juveniles must be released unless the parent or guard-
ian is "incapable under the circumstances to care for him,"2 provided
sufficient grounds for denying the juvenile access to money bail. The
probable cause requirements and the mandate for general release in
state law were said to provide "an adequate substitute for bail."29
Describing the grounds upon which detention may be continued
should probable cause be found is a most difficult undertaking. 0
Courts attempting to do so have wandered rather aimlessly in the mo-
rass.3 While saying that the burden of persuasion as to the ultimate
issue is on the State,82 or at least that release is to be the presumed
holding, 3 and that detention must be based on competent evidence,34
the grounds for detention are usually left vague. In only one reported
case, and a most curious one at that, is a ground for detention or re-
lease specifically stated.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Kinney v. Lenon,35 ordered
the release of a seventeen-year-old boy pending his hearing, on the
ground that such release was required to aid the juvenile in the prepara-
tion of his case. He had been charged with an assault arising out of a
schoolyard tussle in which a significant number of other persons were
said to be involved. The court found that it would be impossible for
the juvenile's attorney to find any of these witnesses without the aid of
his client. The court released the young person to the custody of either
parent or the attorney to prevent the denial of a fair trial. Further
analysis of bail and detention questions was deemed unnecessary after
this release order was made.
Kinney is a strange case. Issues traditionally thought to be related
to release on recognizance, such as community roots and likelihood of
appearing for trial,"6 are not discussed. There is no analysis of issues
28. Id. at 1233.
29. id. A similar result occurred in the District of Columbia. Cooley v. Stone,
414 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
30. See Ferster, Snethen & Courtless, Juvenile Detention: Protection, Prevention
or Punishment?, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 161 (1969).
31. See Kinney v. Lenon, 425 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1970); Fulwood v. Stone, 394
F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220, 1233 (E.D. Wis.
1969), rev'd on other grounds, 442 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1971); Doe v. State, 487 P.2d
47 (Alas. 1971).
32. Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220, 1231-32 (E.D. Wis. 1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 442 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1971).
33. Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47
(Alas. 1971).
34. Cases cited notes 29-33 supra.
35. 425 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1970).
36. Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail (pts. 1-2), 113 U. PA. L. REV.
960, 1125 (1965); Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City,
106 U. PA. L. REV. 693 (1958); Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administra-
tion of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1954).
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related to preventive detention, such as danger of the youth to the com-
munity. While Kinney is a provocative decision which may have a
significant impact on detention practices for old and young if expanded
beyond its facts, it leaves untouched those issues which are likely to be
relevant to most persons charged with crime. Inability of any person,
other than the defendant, to identify witnesses, or some other severe
trial preparation problem, is not likely to be a useful argument for most
defendants.
The New Jersey detention rules in effect during the time the sample
cases in the data bank were filed are typical of many state rules and
statutes defining those groups of juveniles to be detained pending trial.
While this study was being completed, the detention rules were signifi-
cantly altered to provide speedier and more formal detention hearings,
with counsel present, for those juveniles in county youth facilities."7
However, neither the old nor the new rules provide for a probable cause
hearing as a prerequisite to continuing detention. The new rules very
clearly provide that detention is not the presumed course of action for
either the police or the court"8 and that detention by a court must be
based upon facts adduced at hearing. 9 The new rules also attempt
to define those groups which may be detained.40 The old rules did not
specifically state any detention standards.
The newly stated standards are "appropriately" vague. Detention
by the court is deemed proper only if the court finds that:
(1) In view of the nature of the offense charged and his past behavior,
the juvenile's release might result in physical harm to himself or to the
community; or
(2) There is no suitable place for the juvenile to reside, or the juvenile
refuses to return to his home, or there is no suitable adult who will ac-
cept the juvenile, or there is no suitable adult with the ability to control
the juvenile and protect his health and well-being; or
(3) There is reason to believe that if released, the juvenile will not ap-
pear at future hearings. If the juvenile or the adult in whose custody
he is released reside out-of-state, the court may require a bond to be
posted in such amount as it deems reasonably necessary to insure such
appearances as may be required.4
1
These standards state the general types of juveniles which may be de-
tained: those who are "dangerous," live in "bad" homes,, or flee prose-
37. See N.J.R. 5:8-2, 5:8-6. The new rules went into effect on September 15,
1971. The rules also alter standards to be used by the police in deciding to detain.
The invisibility of this decision makes the impact hard to measure. In any event, the
detention data describes practices existing a year ago, and gives significant insight
into the types of juveniles likely to be detained.
38. N.J.R. 5:8-2(b), 5:8-6(e).
39. N.J.R. 5:8-6(e).




cution. The mixture of concepts aimed to protect society, the juveniles
and the courts is clear. Though the standards are broadly stated, they
are sufficiently clear to raise the basic issues of the propriety of using
such general classifications and the priority for their use.
Note carefully that even the new detention rules have the effect of
mixing dangerous and non-dangerous offenders in detention facilities
without any probable cause finding.42 While the data gathered for this
study involved cases processed prior to the effective date of the new de-
tention rules, analysis of the data provided a wealth of information
about the use of standards similar to those now embodied in court
rules. Although the impact of the new rules is not measured here, ex-
cept to the extent that interviews subsequent to the effective date of the
detention rules have revealed change,43 the data does provide a basis
upon which to judge the propriety of using standards like those in the
new rules, or other more objective standards. In addition, the data
provides a basis upon which to measure the impact of detention on the
later stages of the judicial process. The lack of probable cause hear-
ings does not negate the possibility that there is some relationship be-
tween detention, adjudications of guilt, and dispositions.
Finally, some judicial thought has been given to the needs of the
juvenile during detention." In addition to the availability of treat-
ment for juveniles actually confined pending hearing, there is the basic
problem about the degree to which highly secure detention is required.45
42. While an argument could be made that New Jersey's detention system is uncon-
stitutional because it lacks a probable cause hearing, there are considerations which
make the value of such a hearing questionable. If the purpose of such a hearing is to
reduce the use of detention, other devices may be available. See notes 113-20 infra
and accompanying text. If the probable cause hearing is viewed as a filtering device to
reduce caseloads, there are also problems. See note 122 infra and accompanying text.
43. The students who contributed to the preparation of this article have observed
that the new rules are not being very carefully implemented. In Mercer and Essex
Counties, second detention hearings have not been regularly held unless law students
are available to man them. In Hudson County, the first and second hearings are
merged into one, leaving the process just as before the rule change; counsel was always
present at the old detention hearings in the county. In Bergen County, second hear-
ings have been held. There is a feeling in the Office of the Public Defender that use
of detention by the court has decreased significantly in the county.
44. In Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967), in dictum, the court indicated
that upon substantial complaint by the juvenile, the Juvenile Court should make an
appropriate inquiry into the juvenile's needs. See also Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939
(D.C. Cir. 1967). In addition to Creek, the court has dealt with treatment of juven-
iles at the disposition stage. In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967). As to the
mentally ill and senile, see Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Lake v.
Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
(N.D. Ala. 1971); Note, Due Process for All-Constitutional Standards for Involun-
tary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. CmH. L. REV. 633 (1967); Note, Civil Re-
straint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967).
45. See Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Creek v. Stone, 379
F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alas. 1971).
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The tendency of courts to act as if the only detention alternatives are
total release or total confinement is strong. As the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia said in Fulwood v. Stone :46
There are some indications in the record that the court may have
thought that its only choices were continuation of appellant's probation
or commitment to the Receiving Home. The choices are not so limited.
The Juvenile Court has a duty to fashion an appropriate disposition
notwithstanding any failure by the juvenile's representatives to make
specific proposals-though such failure is not condoned.
4 7
The creation of non-institutional conditions for juveniles awaiting their
hearings is a fairly clear necessity. 48 The New Jersey Court Rules per-
mit this practice,49 but do not emphasize the importance of release on
conditions as a means of controlling the use of detention facilities. The
courts of New Jersey do not widely use non-incarcerative conditions be-
fore hearing. Though it may be a time-consuming task to find non-
institutional placements pending hearing, that may be the price to be
paid for the proper utilization of the rehabilitative ideal in a live proc-
ess.
2. Adjudication Hearing. The primary legal issues directly relating
to juvenile court hearings were dealt with by the Supreme Court in In
re Gault,5" In re Winship,5 and McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.52 The
Gault Court required that juveniles be notified of the charges against
them; be given opportunity to confront adverse witnesses; be assigned
counsel in cases where commitment is possible, counsel is desired and
the juvenile is unable to afford counsel; and be given the protection of
the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment. In Winship, it
was decided that findings of delinquency must be made on the basis of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. McKeiver held that juries are not
constitutionally required in delinquency hearings.
The problems of integrating Gault and Winship into the operation
of juvenile courts have been complex. The large scale entrance of at-
torneys into courts with self-images of beneficent treatment of their
clientele can cause serious conflict. 3 Teitelbaum and Stapleton, after
a lengthy study of the relationship between attorney and judicial behav-
ior in two juvenile courts, described the problem:
Empirical studies show what is to be expected-traditional courts and
personnel are reluctant to adapt themselves to the new procedures now
46. 394 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
47. Id. at 944.
48. See Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alas. 1971).
49. N.J.R. 5:8-6(e).
50. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
51. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
52. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
53. STAPLETON & TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YouTH: A STuDy OF THE ROLE
OF COUNSEL IN AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS (1972).
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required by the due process clause, particularly as they require injection
of elements of an adversary system into juvenile court proceedings.
This, taken with the increasing appearance of counsel in juvenile court
proceedings, undoubtedly will have consequences for the manner of le-
gal representation. An attorney in traditional courts will find himself
within a legal system which still considers itself non-adversary and
seeks to serve goals not usually associated with other branches of law.
It is only reasonable to anticipate that he will face formal and informal
pressures to conform his manner of participation in delinquency hear-
ings to the values of these courts-for example, to be less of an advo-
cate for the child's best interests. 54
An immediate consequence of Gault in New Jersey was the creation of
two court calendars, informal and formal. 5 Institutionalization may
occur only as a result of a formal hearing with counsel present." The
adversary pressures spoken of above will be most prominent in such
hearings. Informal hearings do not require counsel and may not result
in institutional commitments. However, informal cases may be moved
to the formal calendar at any time.57 In effect, the rule guarantees
that the old juvenile court traditions will remain in full flower in infor-
mal hearings.58
It is apparent that the calendaring decision is important to an alleged
delinquent not only because of the possible consequences as a result of
each type of hearing, but also because of the possible impact the calen-
daring decision may have on the youth's legal representation. While
Stapleton and Teitlebaum's work has not been repeated here, some ef-
fort is made to determine the impact, if any, of calendaring upon ad-
judication and disposition results. In addition, there is discussion of
the types of juveniles most likely to be placed on the two calendars.
This discussion assumes that similar standards should govern detention
and calendaring, at least under New Jersey rules. If dangerous, or
poorly environed juveniles may be detained, presumably because of
their need for institutionalization, they should also be formalized.
Only data relating to flight from the jurisdiction should apply to de-
tention but not calendaring. The data often did not display the ex-
pected similarity in the use of detention and the formal calendar.
Under the new detention rules, continuation of detention by the court
requires formalization.5 9  However, even under this rule, persons
released from detention by the court, or tried at the time of the first
54. Id. at 59-60.
55. N.J.R. 5:9-1(c)-(e).
56. N.J.R. 5:9-1(c), (d).
57. N.J.R. 5:9-1(e).
58. Counsel does not appear often at informal hearings and is subject to the possi-
bility of having his client shifted to the formal calendar if he does appear. A challenge





detention hearing, need not be formalized. Thus, many persons de-
tained at some point may still be placed on the informal calendar.
Two further issues must be noted. First, New Jersey rules permit
juveniles to be channeled to "conference committees" by the juvenile
courts.60 These committees are lay groups appointed by the juvenile
courts. They have the power to make recommendations to juveniles
referred by the court and to refer cases back to court should compli-
ance with their recommendations not be obtained. The decision to re-
fer to a committee is usually at the same point in the process as calen-
daring, that is, shortly after receipt of a complaint by the juvenile court.
The data analysis included information on use of the committees.
Finally, the courts have the authority to remand juveniles adjudi-
cated delinquent but not yet sentenced to detention centers or diagnos-
tic institutions.6' Such remands involve significant periods of total
confinement and may involve juveniles who are not committed to a
state institution or who are adjudicated on the informal calendar. The
use of in-patient remands off informal calendars seems suspect, since
these cases involve persons who may not be committed to state institu-
tions. The relation between calendaring, remand, and disposition is
described in some detail.
3. Disposition. As previously noted, specific analysis is made of the
relationships between detention, adjudication, and disposition. The
disposition problems are of two sorts. First, there is some confusion as
to the degree of confinement it is possible to impose after informal
hearings. Second, more general issues of treatment, length of sentence,
and degree of security are now being raised across the country.62
The calendaring decision is clearly related to dispositions; informal
cases may not lead to commitment. However, the definition of a com-
mitment is not always clear. Probation conditions are sometimes
equivalent, or at least similar to, institutionalization. For example, a
probation sentence with a condition of residence in a particular nar-
cotic addiction rehabilitation center is certainly a serious result. The
Administrative Office of the New Jersey courts agrees that such cases
should be placed on the formal calendar. 6  The degree to which this
is being done is described later.
A related problem is the impact which violating an informal proba-
tion has on resentencing. May such a violator be confined? In State
v. G.J.,64 a juvenile was charged with violating an informal probation
60. N.J.R. 5:9-1(c).
61. N.J.R. 5:9-8.
62. See authorities cited note 5 supra.
63. ADMINISTRATrVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, DISPOSITION MANUAL FOR JUVENILE
JUDGES 2-3 (1971).
64. 108 N.J. Super. 186, 260 A.2d 513 (App. Div. 1969).
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and was committed. The violation hearing was formal. The court
found that the best procedure would have been to file a new complaint.
However, G.J. was not released because the error was said to be harm-
less. She was represented by counsel and a finding of truancy, itself a
delinquent act in New Jersey, was made at the hearing. The study re-
vealed that the preference for a new complaint stated by G.J. was gen-
erally followed.
Of more importance than the technical relationship between calendar
and disposition are the uses to which various dispositions are put by
the courts. Several issues arise in this area. First, the New Jersey re-
formatory system receives persons sentenced from both adult and juve-
nile courts. Second, juveniles may receive longer sentences than adults
for similar behavior. Finally, the delinquency statute does not differ-
entiate between criminal and juvenile status offenders for disposition
purposes. The first two of these issues are not directly relevant to this
study. However, a short description of New Jersey sentencing practice
is appropriate to give a better understanding of the dispositional poli-
cies studied here.
State law permits commitment of males sixteen to thirty to the Youth
Correctional Institution complex,"' and females seventeen or older to
the Correctional Institution for Women. 6 Generally, the training
schools for boys and girls receive the other juveniles committed by ju-
venile courts.67 The reception by the Youth Correctional Institution
and the Correctional Institution for Women of commitments from both
juvenile and adult courts was approved in Johnson v. State." The
court construed the delinquency act to require segregation of adults
and juveniles, and thereafter upheld the commitment of Johnson to the
Correctional Institution.69  Such commitments continue despite open
admission that juveniles and adults are, in fact, not segregated.70
65. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-146; 30:4-147 (1971).
66. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-154 (1971).
67. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-156 to 157.9 (1971).
68. 18 N.J. 422, 114 A.2d 1 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 942 (1956).
69. The same ruling is now judicially compelled statewide by N.J.R. 5:8-6. See
also State v. Smith, 32 N.J. 501, 161 A.2d 520 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 936
(1961).
70. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, DISPOSITION MANUAL FOR JUVENILE
JUDGES 58-59 (1971):
However, except for Yardville, it is not the policy of the state correctional in-
stitutions to use age as the prime consideration in grouping inmates for housing.
The staff at Annandale and Clinton [16-30 years old for men, and over 16 for
women, respectively] have made the policy decision that age is not a good criterion
for grouping inmates, and housing assignments are made on the basis of personality
type. An aggressive and physically well-developed 16 year old will be housed with
older juveniles or adults. Similarly a passive, weak 20 year old may be grouped
with younger inmates. This method of housing is the best for the security needs
of the institutions in the opinion of the staff. Therefore, the mingling of adults
and juveniles occurs in all aspects of life at Annandale and Clinton. Even at
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It is also true that persons committed from juvenile courts are gen-
erally retained within the jurisdiction of that court until they reach the
age of twenty-one regardless of the nature of the act leading to the de-
linquency finding.71 Persons sent from adult courts to the Youth
Correctional Institution or to the Correctional Institution for Women
are generally limited to five years or the maximum term for the of-
fense, whichever is less.7 2 The possibility that juveniles will receive
longer sentences than adults for many minor offenses is very high.
Given such state policies, the rate of commitment of sixteen and seven-
teen-year-old juveniles assumes great importance. While challenges to
such correctional practices are arising, and meeting with some suc-
cess,73 this study is most concerned with the kinds of people being com-
mitted. The existence of mixed adult-juvenile institutions and differ-
ential sentencing practices simply magnifies the degree of any inequi-
ties discovered in this study.
Special attention is paid to the records and offenses of delinquents
committed by the courts. In some jurisdictions, there is legislative and
judicial hostility to using state correctional facilities for juvenile status
offenders.74  However, the New Jersey courts still commit minor of-
fenders in significant numbers. An analysis of such commitments, to-
gether with the impact of detention and calendaring upon such disposi-
tions appears later in the study.
II. STUDY AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
Information for this study was obtained from two basic sources.
First, a random sample of files was taken of the Juvenile Court records
of Bergen, Essex, and Mercer Counties. 75  Data on the juvenile envi-
Yardville [16-30 for men] where age is the prime consideration in housing, there is
contact between juveniles and adults in vocational and educational programs.
The role of "security" in the mingling of inmates is interesting.
71. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-37 (1971); In re Smigelski, 30 N.J. 513, 154 A.2d 1
(1959).
72. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-148 (1971).
73. See authorities cited note 5 supra.
74. See cases cited note 16 supra and statutes cited note 13 supra. See also In re
Kroll, 43 A.2d 706 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1945); In re Johnson, 30 Ill. App. 2d 439,
174 N.E.2d 907 (1961); In re Cromwell, 232 Md. 409, 194 A.2d 88 (1963); In re
Braun, 145 N.W.2d 482 (N.D. 1966); State v. Myers, 74 N.D. 297, 22 N.W.2d 199
(1946).
75. The period sampled was January 1, 1969 to December 31, 1970 (January 1,
1968 to December 31, 1970 for Bergen). The sample contained 200 cases in Bergen,
222 in Essex and 224 in Mercer. Cases transferred to other counties were deleted
from the sample. In Essex County two filing systems were sampled. The conference
committee cases are separately filed from regular court cases. A sample of conference
committee cases was taken, totalling 48. (These cases are not separately analyzed in
this article in any depth.) A further sample of this group of files was mixed with
the court sample for Essex in the proportion in which conference committees were
used during the sample period. No statistics based on these samples were calculated
and all inferences are based on raw data.
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ronment, prior court history, and the outcome of his or her contact
with the court was collected. Second, interviews were conducted with
court personnel, lawyers, police officers, and other persons.76 The
three study counties were selected because of their significantly differ-
ent characteristics. Bergen County is the wealthiest county in New
Jersey. It is generally residential in character. Essex County contains
the city of Newark, the largest urban community in the state. In addi-
tion, it has a large number of wealthy suburban communities and is
very densely populated. Mercer County also contains a significant ur-
ban center, Trenton. However, it is smaller than Newark, and is lo-
cated in a less densely populated county.
The data describing the social situation of the sample juveniles ap-
pears to support the validity of the sample technique. While there
were some differences in the types of persons referred to juvenile courts
by the police, especially between city and suburb, those differences were
quite consistent with police practice or social status. For example,
there were significant racial variations. (Table 2) The differences
were consistent with the different population characteristics of the study
areas, though all the samples contained a higher proportion of Black
defendants than did the general population. 77  The sexual character-
istics of the samples were quite similar, though there was some indica-
tion that Newark court referrals were less likely to be female than in
the rest of Essex County. (Table 1) In general, the samples reflect
the nationwide trend that females appear in delinquency and criminal
76. The following persons were interviewed: Bergen County-Judge Franklin,
Judge Rosenberg, Mr. Mazzola (Clerk of Juvenile Court); Essex-Judge Caruso, Mr.
Gozidlow (Clerk of Juvenile Court), Capt. Hemmer (Newark Youth Aid Bureau);
Mercer-Judge Noden, Mr. Plumeri (Intake Officer, Mercer County Probation Office),
Lt. Joseph Callahan (Trenton Bureau of Juvenile Aid), Geraldine Boone (Secretary of
the Princeton Juvenile Conference Committee). In addition, Marcia Richman of the
Office of the Public Defender, Juvenile Division, was consulted on several occasions.
77. 1970 census data obtained from the Office of Business Economics, Department
of Labor and Industry of the State of New Jersey indicate that the Department of Com-

















cases at a much lower rate than males.7"
There was some sample variation in the juveniles' ages. In the Mer-
cer County sample, there was a decrease in the number of older juve-
niles referred to court by the police. The other two counties displayed
the expected pattern of increased rate of court referral for older persons.
The drop in the proportion of older juveniles in Mercer occurred in
Trenton, but not in the surrounding suburbs. (Table 3) The rea-
sons for the age variations are not entirely clear, though persons in-
volved in the operation of the Mercer Court agreed that such variations
existed. The Trenton Bureau of Juvenile Aid indicated that they had
a decrease in cases involving drugs and non-school attendance among
older juveniles. The data indicated that these perceptions may be true.
(Tables 5, 6; compare Trenton with rest of Mercer and Essex) The
explanation given for such occurrences was that drug experimentation
among non-addicts tapered off after age fifteen and that truancy was of
no concern after age sixteen. 79
The age differences noted led to the expectation that the Trenton
sample would reveal a lower average school grade completed and a
higher proportion of defendants in school than the other samples.
These expectations were fulfilled. Trenton's average grade level was
just below Newark's, a somewhat surprising figure. (Table 4) In ad-
dition, Trenton had the highest proportion of persons in school. (Table
7) Overall, there was substantial variance between city and suburb in
the education data, but the educational level and school status of the
juveniles in the suburban areas of Bergen County, and Mercer and
Essex Counties outside of Trenton and Newark, were about the same.
A similar pattern of city-suburban difference and suburban similar-
ity appeared among the samples in the nature of the home situations of
the arrested juveniles, drug use histories, prior court records and the
seriousness of the pending charges. Essex and Mercer Counties had
fewer juveniles living with both parents than did Bergen County (Ta-
ble 8), and more families where the parents were separated. (Table
9) Although the data on the employment status of the male or female
in the juvenile's home was not always very good, employed women
were present in the juvenile's home in lower proportions, and welfare
families in higher proportions, in Mercer and Essex Counties than in
78. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 44 (1967). The Commission's work
indicates that female involvement in crime is increasing, especially in larceny.
79. Discussion with Captain William Bums, Trenton Bureau of Juvenile Aid, in
Trenton, New Jersey, July 5, 1972. The Trenton pattern was also confirmed on
November 9, 1971 in discussions with Mr. Michael Perlin, an attorney at the Mercet
County Office of the State Office of Public Defender, Juvenile Section. The validity
of the explanations for the age pattern is subject to doubt since the other study areas
did not display similar results. However, the joinder of file and interview data in
Mercer leaves little doubt that the age difference existed.
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Bergen. (Table 10) An employed male in the family was much less
common in Essex County than in Mercer or Bergen. (Table 11)80
In addition, Mercer and Essex families were larger than Bergen fami-
lies. (Table 12) A history of drug use appeared in the sample files
most often in Essex. Addictive drug histories were most prevalent
among Newark residents; suburban Essex cases displayed more non-
addictive drug use than any other sample area. (Table 13) In the
data, disorganization or larger family size were most likely to appear
in Trenton and, especially, Newark; suburban Mercer and Essex Coun-
ties and Bergen County displayed very similar, less serious, problem
rates.
Other data, describing the characteristics of juveniles' court cases
rather than their social or family situations, displayed similar city-sub-
urban variations. Several different types of data were accumulated to
describe the juveniles' prior records: prior calendaring decisions, prior
dispositions, and the number of prior delinquency adjudications. Gen-
erally, the Essex, and especially the Newark, sample contained the most
serious prior histories on all of these measures. (Tables 14-17)
Similarly, sample juveniles in Essex, and especially Newark, had the
most serious charges pending against them; Bergen had more minor
charges. (Table 18)
From the data described, it is fairly clear that the Essex sample con-
tained the largest "problem population," and that the suburban data of
all three counties was very similar. This was confirmed when a point
scale was created which assigned a point to a case for each of the fol-
lowing factors: a prior record existed; a prior commitment to a state
institution had occurred; a history of addictive drug use appeared; a
bench warrant was used to obtain the juvenile's appearance; the juve-
nile's area of residence was out of state; or new charges were filed sub-
sequent to the initial arrest, but before hearing. Using this scale, the
median number of points per juvenile was highest in Essex, followed by
Mercer and Bergen. (Table 19) The point scale made it equally
clear that Newark and Trenton contained a larger portion of problem
cases than the rest of their respective counties. Finally, the closeness of
the point measures in Bergen County and suburban Mercer and Essex
confirmed the validity of the sample technique.
III. POLICE AND COURT PROCESSING
A. Introduction
The three sample counties processed their juveniles in significantly
80. The vast difference appearing in the data in Table 11 should be taken with
some degree of salt. Many of the "no information" cases in Essex involved juveniles
without prior court records.
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different ways. In some cases, it became clear that these differences
produced interesting impacts on the outcome for accused juveniles.
This section of the study analyzes the interview and file data, with spe-
cific emphasis on detention, calendaring, adjudication rates, remands
for examinations, and dispositions.
Each study county contains numerous municipalities. The resulting
multiplicity of police departments made it extremely difficult to study
pre-court processing of juveniles accused of delinquency. Information
was available in court files as to the types of persons referred to juvenile
courts by the police or other agencies, 81 the kinds of persons detained
by the various police departments, the operation of court intake pro-
cedures, the characteristics of those juveniles released after initial de-
tention, and the operation of later court procedures.
In Trenton and Newark, large scale screening systems operated at
the police level. Most of Mercer County's court cases originated in
Trenton's Bureau of Juvenile Aid, which also controlled policies and
practices for its arrestees up to the time a petition was filed in court.
The Bureau's caseload numbered 3,363 in 1970. Of this number, 1,370
(about 41 per cent) led to the filing of petitions with the juvenile
court.8 2 The Mercer County Probation Department also exercised a
great deal of control over initial stages of the judicial process. Au-
thority to release from detention and to calendar resided primarily with
the Department. 3 Interestingly enough, we will see that the data re-
flected these administrative divisions of authority.
The large number of juveniles processed by the police and the court
in Newark has also led to several pre-judicial screening mechanisms.
The Youth Aid Bureau of Newark handled about 10,800 cases in
1970.84 Of these, about 5,000 (46 per cent) eventually involved a
petition before the juvenile court. Many of the remainder were "un-
solved" cases. The Bureau, especially in non-detained cases, would
often summon juveniles and their parents for investigation confer-
81. It should be noted that the court itself discouraged private parties from filing
complaints directly with the Juvenile Court. Persons were urged to go to their local
police. The stated reason for this practice is lack of personnel to process the load of
possible complaints. Interview with Mr. Michael Mazzola, Clerk of Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, Bergen County, in Hackensack, New Jersey, Apr. 15, 1971.
82. Interview with Lt. Joseph Callahan, Trenton Bureau of Juvenile Aid, in
Trenton, New Jersey, Apr. 22, 1971. The Bureau does not keep separate statistics on
conference requests. The actual proportion of referrals should be revealed by the data.
See Table 78.
83. Interviews with Lt. Joseph Callahan, Trenton Bureau of Juvenile Aid, in Tren-
ton, New Jersey, Apr. 22, 1971; Judge Noden, Mercer County Juvenile Court, in
Trenton, New Jersey, May 7, 1971; Mr. Plumed, Intake Officer, Mercer County Proba-
tion Department, in Trenton, New Jersey, Apr. 22, 1971.
84. Interview with Captain Hemmer, Newark Youth Aid Bureau, in Newark, New
Jersey, May 17, 1971.
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ences. s5 Some cases were closed at these conferences after promises of
parental discipline were obtained by police. In addition, the court
clerk, and the personnel of the county detention facility did some
screening after the police had decided to detain persons. While they
did not act to dismiss or drop complaints, they did release some juve-
niles they felt should not be detained."6
The initial decision to detain was made in all three counties by local
police who brought a detained person to a county detention center. As
previously mentioned, the new detention rules in New Jersey, here used
mostly as a model to analyze behavior under the old rules, provide that
three basic types of juveniles may be subject to detention: those dan-
gerous to themselves or the community, those from bad homes, and
those likely to flee the jurisdiction.17  Various data were available to
study the degree to which these standards may have influenced initial
detention decisions and decisions to maintain detention. The type of
charges pending against a juvenile, the prior record of an accused,
and the occurrence of a rearrest before hearing each create perceptions
commonly used to judge the juvenile's danger to his or her community.
Similarly, drug history, age and school status are relevant to perceptions
about an accused's ability to handle personal problems. Age may cut
two ways. Young persons may be seen as either vulnerable or less
dangerous. At times, the data reflected this conflict. The viability
of an accused's home life was measured by the marital status of the
parents and by the juvenile's place of residence. Overall, parental
marital status and place of residence generated very similar results in
the data analysis. For convenience, place of residence is generally
used. Finally, the use of bench warrants in the county or state of
residence were useful to measure the relationship between likelihood of
flight and detention.
The same factors described above, except for data relating to flight
from the jurisdiction, were also used in analyzing calendaring, remand-
ing, and disposition decisions. Social and individual danger, and fam-
ily status, are those factors traditionally used as rationales for confine-
ment after adjudication. It makes some sense to envision a model sys-
tem where the use of detention, calendaring, and confinement after ad-
judication would each be very closely related to the same factors, such
85. Id. It should be noted that the forms used to request the appearance of a
juvenile with his or her parents at the Youth Aid Bureau do not reveal the nature of the
charges that might be filed; nor do they reveal that court proceedings might follow
the meeting, that statements made might be used later, or that an attorney should ac-
company the juvenile. The only significant information on the card is bus directions to
the bureau.
86. Interview with Mr. James J. Gozidlow, Juvenile Court Clerk of Essex County,
in Newark, New Jersey, Apr. 27, 1971.
87. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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as serious offenses, prior record, rearrest before hearing, broken fami-
lies, and school failure. Any model system would also operate without
internal effects on itself. That is, any particular step in the process,
such as detention, should affect the ultimate outcome only to the degree
that prior record, or other information describing the juvenile's social
and family history, relates to that outcome. As the data unfolded, such
a model system did not operate in any of the study counties.
B. Detention and Calendaring
1. Police Detention. About one third of the juveniles in all three
samples were detained at some point during their passage through the
juvenile court. (Table 20) There were indications in all three coun-
ties that this substantial rate of detention was not completely justified
by police perceptions of community danger. For example, in Bergen,
a rearrest after release but before hearing had little impact on police de-
tention rates. (Table 20; compare Mercer and Essex) In all three
counties, alleged serious offenders (those charged with assaultive be-
havior or serious drug violations) were detained at high rates, but juve-
nile status offenders (those charged with behavior illegal only for ju-
veniles) were detained in equally large proportions. (Table 21)
This occurred even though medium offenders had equally high rates of
rearrest before hearing. (Table 22) The rearrest and crime data in-
dicated a significant possibility of detention's overuse by police, insofar
as these factors measured community danger.
The possibility that detention was overused for non-dangerous juve-
nile status offenders was confirmed by the prior record data in all three
counties. First, prior records were not related to crime charged in any
significant way. (Table 24) Furthermore, juveniles with serious past
histories were generally detained more often by police than others (Ta-
bles 23, 25, 26, 27), regardless of the crime charged. (Table 28)
However, juvenile status offenders were detained at levels as high or
higher than other juveniles regardless of record. (Table 28)
It is interesting to note that juvenile status offenders were more
likely to be female than were other types of offenders (Table 30), and
that females were more likely to be detained than males in Bergen and
Mercer Counties. (Table 29) The lower female detention rate in Es-
sex appeared due only to the very large number of serious male of-
fenders in the county. (Table 31) While the detention difference by
sex was reduced when crime and prior record were held constant
(compare Table 29 with Tables 31, 32), there was still some possi-
bility, especially in Mercer, that females were detained more often than
their male counterparts. (Table 31, Mercer; Table 32) Even assum-
ing equal treatment, the basic fact remained that females were charged
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more often with juvenile status offenses and that the detention rate for
these offenses was high.
In a similar fashion, the difference in detention between whites and
Blacks (Table 29) was at least in part attributable to the interaction be-
tween record and crime type. Blacks were detained more often re-
gardless of their record (Table 34), and the higher detention rate for
Blacks occurred most clearly among serious and medium offenders.
(Table 33) However, this made some sense, since Blacks were more
likely to be rearrested and have prior records in these offense groups.
(Tables 35, 36)
To this point, the data indicated that while perceptions of community
danger may have been considered by the police when detaining some
offenders, especially those charged with serious offenses and having
serious prior histories, many detained juveniles did not fit any obvious
definition of social danger. Nor did other factors descriptive of one's
abilities to handle personal difficulties, such as drug usage, school at-
tendance, or age, aid in explaining the high detention rates for status of-
fenders, or for females in Mercer County. For example, as expected,
juveniles with a history of drug usage had a higher rate of detention
than the rest of the various samples. (Table 37) While the data was
sometimes sparse, the trend indicated a very high detention rate for
persons with addictive drug histories. In Bergen and Mercer, those
with non-addictive drug histories were also detained at high rates. In
addition, prior record, family status, and drug history each had an in-
dependent relationship to detention rates in all three samples. (Ta-
bles 38, 40) While this confirmed a hypothesis that drug histories,
even non-addictive ones in two samples, related to detention rates, it
did not reduce the possibility of overuse of detention in some cases.
Non-addictive drug use does not represent a great danger to the gen-
eral community, though in some cases it may indicate that the juvenile
is in some personal difficulty. But most important, juvenile status of-
fenders had drug histories less often than other offenders (Table 39),
and females in Mercer were unlikely to have drug histories. (Table
41)
The school status data operated much like the drug history informa-
tion. Except in Essex, persons not in school were more likely to be de-
tained than those in school (Table 42), regardless of prior record.
(Table 43) However, the data, though sparse, also indicated that
juvenile status offenders were detained at high rates even when in
school. (Table 44) In addition, no apparent relationship existed be-
tween age and detention in any sample. (Tables 45, 47) While pol-
ice may have hesitated to file complaints against younger persons, they
did not hesitate to detain them once the decision to file a complaint
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was made. Mercer's lower detention rate for very young persons (Ta-
ble 45) was completely dissipated when prior record was held con-
stant. (Table 47) Though the data got sparse, the high use of de-
tention for juvenile status offenders continued regardless of age. (Ta-
ble 46)
One might hypothesize that bad home situations led to the higher
juvenile status detention rates. Though juvenile status offenders often
came from bad family situations, their rate of split homes did not differ
widely from that of serious offenders. (Table 48) In addition, while
split families were more likely to occur among detained cases (Table
49), the bad home influenced only crime categories other than juve-
nile status offenders in Bergen; split family status offenders were still
detained at a very high rate in Mercer; and the effect of a split family
dissipated when crime was held constant in Essex. (Table 50) The
similarity of the family status data to the trends already noted was con-
firmed by tabulations showing that prior record (Table 51) and drug
history (Table 40) had cumulative impacts with family status in Ber-
gen and Mercer. While family status may explain part of the differ-
ential detention by sex in Mercer, females were still detained at high
levels in split family situations. (Table 52)
The data is superficially inconsistent with the new detention rules'
requirements that juveniles not be detained by the police unless they
are dangerous or unless persons do not exist to care for them. How-
ever, it is quite possible that persons, even from unsplit families, were
not willing to come forward to assume custody of status offenders as
often as in other cases. The possibility that parents of "incorrigibles"
and "runaways" would refuse custody is a plausible explanation of the
data.
The explanation appeared to operate in fact, especially in Bergen
and Mercer Counties. Except in Bergen, juveniles from split homes
were more likely to be involved in parental complaint cases. (Table
53) Most importantly, parental complaint cases were much more
likely to involve status offenders than other types of crime. (Table 55)
In Bergen and Mercer, the police detained most juveniles in cases in-
volving parental complaints. (Table 54) Mercer released many of
the juveniles before hearing, while Bergan did not. (Table 54) In
Essex, a slightly larger proportion of parental complaint juveniles were
detained by the police and the court. (Table 54) The Bergen pattern
was most disturbing but both Mercer and Essex seemed to detain
youngsters whose parents were upset with them. Detention of juve-
niles in secure facilities simply for lack of a place to put them, when
state agencies could endeavor to find non-incarcerative placements for
such persons, is difficult to justify. The ability of Mercer to find places
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for some of their parental complaint cases, and the fairly low detention
rates in Essex of such "offenders" indicated that detention need not be
the rule. However, even in Mercer and Essex, the detention of aban-
doned or runaway juveniles at higher rates than criminal offenders
hardly seems to be the solution to family disputes.
Finally, likelihood of flight from the jurisdiction may also have af-
fected detention. Though the data was a bit sparse, those cases involv-
ing either juveniles living outside of Bergen County, or use of bench
warrants in Mercer and Essex, increased the rate of detention. (Ta-
bles 56, 57)
Using the point system described previously, and computing the me-
dian number of points per juvenile in various crime and detention situ-
ations, the results confirmed the data patterns described. The median
number of points per juvenile did not significantly differ among de-
tained and non-detained status offenders, except to some degree in
Mercer where the general data trends were not as strong. (Table 59)
Overall, detention cases had more points than non-detention cases.
2. Judicial Detention. Shortly after the police filed the complaint,
two important decisions were made. First, if the juvenile was detained a
decision had to be made as to whether that detention would continue.
Second, a calendar decision occurred. In Bergen County, notations
that detention hearings were held subsequent to initial arrests appeared
in 26 per cent (47/184) of the files. In Essex, the figure was
19 per cent (36/186). These proportions were fairly close to the
initial arrest detention rates in both counties. (Table 20) Informal
releases without hearing accounted for the differences. Among those
files without any record of a detention process, the rate of release was
much higher than the rest of the samples. (Table 74)
In Mercer County, detention hearings were held in less than 1 per
cent (1/174) of the cases. That figure is appalling, and is hopefully
different now that the new detention rules are in effect.8 ' This
pattern existed because release decisions were generally made by either
88. The low rate of detention hearings was confirmed in discussions with Lt. Joseph
Callahan at the Trenton Bureau of Juvenile Aid. He could remember only one time
when detention hearings were held, during the Trenton riots. Interview of Apr. 22,
1971. Further confirmation of the data pattern was given by Judge Noden of the
Mercer County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. While he had authority to re-
lease juveniles, and informally did so when called by the Probation Department, most
juveniles were released by the Bureau of Juvenile Aid. Interview in Trenton, New
Jersey, May 7, 1971.
During the fall semester of the 1972-73 school year, Chuck Moriarty, one of my
students, worked in the Mercer County Juvenile Court. My discussions with him indi-
cate that first detention hearings under the new detention rules are now being held, that
few juveniles are held in detention if persons appear to take custody, that second deten-
tion hearings are few in number, and that the Probation Department has general au-
thority to release juveniles to parents, guardians, or other custodians prior to hearings.
[Vol. 26
JUVENILE COURT PROCESS
the Bureau of Juvenile Aid or the Probation Department. If the Pro-
bation Department desired to release a juvenile, they would usually call
the court and obtain permission. However, hearings were not held
even if the juvenile remained in custody. This procedure was highly
questionable. Even under the old detention rules, the court should
have routinely exercised its own power, in hearing, once the police de-
cided to bring a juvenile to a detention center.
Ironically, the non-judicial release procedures used in Mercer re-
sulted in significantly more releases pending hearing than in Bergen or
Essex Counties. Three-quarters of those detained by the police in
Mercer were released before their adjudication hearings, while about
half in Essex, and one-fourth in Bergen were so released. (Table 62)
While detained cases were tried quicker than others in all three coun-
ties, a very noticeable trend towards speedy adjudications appeared in
Bergen. (Table 60) As this and other data will indicate, the some-
what similar police detention patterns of the study counties were fol-
lowed by dramatically different judicial processing.
In Bergen, the court did release before hearing some juveniles who
had been detained by the police, though the proportion released was
quite small. Significant differences appeared in the Bergen sample be-
tween the types of persons detained by the police and by the court.
For example, the type of crime charged made little difference in the
release decision. (Table 62) Retention rates were high for everyone,
in striking contrast to the police detention data. The release pattern
reassumed only mild similarity to police practice when prior record and
rearrests were considered. Though the data was quite sparse, rear-
rested persons were never released. (Table 61) Those without rec-
ords were more likely to be released but the detention rate was still
very high for them. (Table 63) In addition, the seriousness of the
prior record had little impact on the detention decision. (Tables 64,
65) The police pattern indicated a trend to make much more precise
distinctions based on factors related to perceptions of community dan-
ger. (Tables 25, 26, 27)
The reason for the lessening in effect of type crime and prior record
was fairly clear. Juveniles with drug histories of any kind were rarely
released. (Table 66) Juveniles without such histories obtained their
release pending hearing almost a third of the time. Given this data, it
was not surprising that a drug history overwhelmed prior record in the
release decision. (Table 67) In addition, those not living with both
parents were less likely to be released. Family status also overwhelmed
prior record as a factor in the release decision. (Table 71; see also
Tables 53, 54) These trends were confirmed by data showing that
the effects of drug history and family status were cumulative. (Table
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68) Age (Table 69) and school status had little impact on the re-
lease decision (80 per cent of those in school and 85 per cent of those
not in school were detained). It appeared that juveniles' personal
problems concerned the court more than other factors.
The data confirmed interview information indicating that the Bergen
court was quite concerned with the environments of drug users and
those living in bad homes. 89 However, the large retention rate seemed
beyond that necessary to deal with those situations. (For example, Ta-
ble 64) Regardless of a juvenile's background the odds favored de-
tention in Bergen. In addition, the high overall retention rate of de-
tained persons by the court left almost untouched whatever question-
able detention practices existed at the police level. Most noticeably,
juvenile status offenders were retained at a high rate.
In Mercer, factors measuring social danger were also less clearly re-
lated to release than to initial detention. For example, juvenile status
offenders were the least likely to be released, while others rearrested
just as often (medium offenders) were released most often. (Table
62) In addition, prior record did not relate as strongly to release as it
did to initial detention. (Tables 63, 64, 65; compare Table 25) Only
those with serious dispositions in their histories and rearrests before
hearing were not released at very high rates. (Tables 64, 61) Simi-
larly, no clear relationship between detention and drugs appeared to
operate in the release decision. (Table 66) Furthermore, the rela-
tionship between age and detention was the reverse of what one might
expect; the younger the juvenile, the lower the release rate. (Table
69) No factor measuring perceptions of social or personal danger was
closely related to the release decision.
Family situation may have some relationship to the release decision.
More juveniles living with both parents were released (Table 70), but
it was possible (the data was thin) that whatever small impact prior
record had on release accounted for much of the difference. (Table
71; but see Table 54) Just as with the initial detention decision, racial
differences did not appear relevant to release while sexual differences
did.
The data trend's lack of clear direction was substantiated, and per-
haps explained, by interviews with persons at the Trenton Bureau of
Juvenile Aid and the Mercer County Probation Department. The
Bureau personnel said they usually released juveniles once their investi-
gations were complete. Only very serious cases or parental refusals to
accept their children led to continued confinement.9" The data may
89. Interview with Mr. Michael Mazzola, Clerk of Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, Bergen County, in Hackensack, New Jersey, Apr. 15, 1971.
90. Interview with Lt. Joseph Callahan, Trenton Bureau of Juvenile Aid, in Tren-
ton, New Jersey, Apr. 22, 1971.
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confirm this. (Tables 54, 62, 64, 70). In addition, the Probation De-
partment exercised authority to release detained juveniles after a
delinquency petition was on file. 91 They often did so when parents or
others appeared to take the juveniles from the detention center. The
apparent result of the informal process was a pattern of release which
was not related to any obvious social purposes except perhaps the in-
vestigatory needs of the police departments, and, for those of us who
dislike juvenile detention, the satisfaction of pure principle.
In Essex, too, various types of persons were released pending hear-
ing. Serious offenders and, perhaps, juvenile status offenders were
least likely to be released. (Table 62) Those with prior records were
more likely to be retained in detention than those without records.
(Tables 63, 64, 65) While serious past histories led to fewer releases,
the relationships were not nearly as strong as those for the initial de-
tention decision. (Compare Tables 25, 26, 27) Though the data was
thin, drug history did not appear to have a large impact on release
(Table 66), nor did age. (Table 69) In contrast to the initial deten-
tion decision, family status was closely related to the release decision.
(Table 70) Though the data was thin in spots, the impact of prior
record and family status was cumulative. (Table 71) Thin data
made sexual and racial analysis impossible.
In Essex, more than the other two counties, some degree of analysis
seemed to be occurring at the court level. But while all the above Es-
sex data was interesting, the variable most closely related to release
from detention was the date on which the detention hearing was held.
During the first six months of a calendar year, half the detainees were
released. During the second half of the year, almost everyone was de-
tained. (Table 74) For those without detention hearings noted in
their files, almost everyone was released, confirming the use of infor-
mal release procedures by the detention center. (Table 74) Neither
Essex's initial detention rates nor Bergen's release data conformed to
the up and down pattern of the Essex release data. (Table 74, 75)
All this was not very mysterious. The judges sitting at detention hear-
ings rotated every six months during the period of this study. Deten-
tion patterns fluctuated noticeably at the points of judicial rotation.
Needless to say, the detention practices of the two judges differed.
Large differences in detention rates by date of the detention hearing
continued regardless of prior record and, possibly, crime."' (Table
76)
91. Interview with Mr. Plumeri, Intake Officer, Mercer County Probation De-
partment, in Trenton, New Jersey, Apr. 22, 1971.
92. The crime data was fairly thin but still showed sizable disparities. Data of
value was available only for serious and medium offenders. Serious offenders whose
detention hearings were in the first six months of the year were detained pending hear-
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The overall trends noted here were confirmed by use of the point
scales which showed some differences between retained and released
juveniles in Essex and Bergen, and very little in Mercer. (Table 73)
The extraordinarily different uses of detention by police and courts,
and among the various courts, raises several interesting issues. First
and most obviously, is the problem of uniformity of treatment. The
restrictions of the new detention rules could reduce some of the dis-
parity. However, it is quite possible that the differences noted will
continue relatively unaltered into the future. In Bergen, the use of de-
tention together with quick adjudications could continue unabated with
use of informal hearings at the same time initial detention decisions are
made. In Mercer, the relative ease with which juveniles were released
might not be changed by the need to obtain official judicial sanction
under the new rules. Essex's judicial differences were not related to
the old detention rules in any particular way.93 These problems will
be discussed in more detail in the concluding section.
3. Calendaring. The lengthy description of detention undertaken
here is important not simply because detention itself is a significant
impingement upon free movement, but also because of the impact the
decision to detain may have on later phases of the juvenile court proc-
ess. 94  The most immediate impact was upon calendaring. (Table
77) As noted previously, the two procedural steps of detention and
calendaring should be similarly viewed in terms of the standards to be
used in arriving at the decisions. If formal calendar cases are those
where institutionalization is possible, presumably the same factors of
social danger or broken families, relevant to detention would be im-
portant to formalization. Only Mercer's formalization rate was any-
where close to its detention rate. None of the counties displayed uni-
formity in the use of detention and formal hearings. (Compare Tables
78, 20)
As with judicial detention, the calendaring patterns varied signifi-
cantly in the study counties. (Table 78) For example, even though
ing at rates of 43 per cent (%4, initial arrest), 60 per cent (f, subsequent arrest) and
50 per cent (42, total cases). Medium offenders in the same period were detained
at rates of 29 per cent (34), 60 per cent (%) and 43 per cent (5/2). Serious cases
heard later in the year were detained pending hearing in the following proportions:
100 per cent (9A), 100 per cent (7h) and 100 per cent (10A0). The rates for medium
offenders were 70 per cent (7/o), 86 per cent (/J) and 76 per cent (17).
93. At least in Bergen and Mercer, there is some indication that the old trends
continue in part. The experience of Mr. Larry Maddock and Mr. Melvin Gutman, now
working with the Office of the Public Defender in Bergen as part of a course of mine,
indicates that there is sometimes pressure to plead juveniles guilty at detention hearings.
See also note 86 supra.
94. For a look at the impact of bail on adult criminal proceedings, see Banfield &




the detention rate in Bergen was the highest among the study coun-
ties, their formalization rate was the lowest. In contrast to Mercer and
Essex, detention did not as a rule lead to formalization in Bergen (Ta-
ble 77); informalization was clearly the rule. (Table 78) Part of the
explanation for this fact was found in the administrative method used to
calendar. The Clerk of the Bergen Juvenile Court calendared most of
the informal cases, and took to a judge for review only those cases he
felt might be formalized. The clerk indicated that informal discus-
sions with the police and the existence of a prior formal hearing,
weighed heavily in his decision to take a file to a judge for possible for-
malization. Type crime, age, prior record, and drug involvement, es-
pecially if the police indicated deep involvement in drugs, also had an
impact on his decision.95
Much of the clerk's description appeared to be operating in fact.
Among juveniles with prior records, only those last adjudicated on the
formal calendar were highly likely to be formalized. Other prior rec-
ords had no impact. (Table 79) Those with serious prior dispositions
or two or more prior adjudications were placed on the formal calen-
dar more often than others. (Tables 81, 82) The presence of a sec-
ond arrest before the defendant's hearing also had some effect on cal-
endaring. (Table 84) The importance of prior record in the calen-
daring decision was displayed by the crime data. While a lower pro-
portion of cases were formalized among lesser offenders, and this pat-
tern continued for those with and without prior records, formalization
was much reduced for non-record cases. (Table 88)
Other factors creating perceptions of danger to self or others also re-
lated to calendaring. A drug history led to more formal hearings
(Table 89) and the relationship was cumulative with prior record.
(Table 90) Older persons were more likely to be formalized (Table
91), and older age and prior record both operated to increase formali-
zation. (Table 92) In addition, juveniles from broken families were
more likely to be formalized (Table 93); this relationship was also cu-
mulative with prior record. (Table 94) It is interesting to note that
the calendaring of males and females did not differ significantly (Ta-
ble 96), and that this trend continued for all types of crime. (Table
98)
Summarizing, serious charges, prior record, drug history, family
status and older age were all related to calendaring in Bergen. The ov-
erall contrast with the detention practices of the court was substantial,
especially with respect to parental complaint and juvenile status of-
fenders. (Compare Tables 86, 87 with Tables 21, 54) If juvenile
95. Interview with Mr. Michael Mazzola, Clerk of Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, Bergen County, in Hackensack, New Jersey, Apr. 15, 1971.
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status offenders or parental complaint cases were informalized and,
therefore, not subject to institutionalization, one must wonder why
they were detained at high levels by the police and the court.
Overall, formal calendars and conference committees were used more
often in Mercer than in Bergen. (Table 78) Part of the cause for
this difference appeared to lie in the vastly different calendaring proce-
dures used in the two counties. In Mercer, the calendar decision was
largely delegated by the court to the Probation Department. There,
the Intake Officer calendared most cases of those petitioned as delin-
quents for the first time and sent most of the remainder to probation
officers for review of their old files. 6 Once a file was sent to a pro-
bation officer's desk, a fairly high use of the formal calendar could be
expected. The administrative layering of an Intake Officer and other
officers may well have created a feeling that serious cases usually passed
by the Intake Officer. The data confirmed this hypothesis. Files with
notations of probation officer assignments had much higher use of the
formal calendar. (Table 80) The administrative pattern also led to
the expectation that prior record was basic to calendaring, and that
after only one prior adjudication, a large number of juveniles would be
formalized. Such was the case. Formalization jumped from 6 per
cent for those without a record to 51 per cent after one adjudication.
(Tables 79, 81; contrast Bergen) As also might be expected, formali-
zation was higher for those with quite serious past histories. A prior
adjudication at a formal hearing almost guaranteed formalization.
(Table 76) In addition, those with serious prior dispositions were
formalized somewhat more often than others. (Tables 82, 83) A
huge difference in formalization rates existed between those who had
previously been placed on probation and those with administrative prior
records. (Table 79) Such administrative record cases usually in-
volved arrests, Conference Committee assignments, or prior acquittals
and dismissals. Apparently the calendaring officers were more swayed
by a quick succession of arrests than by older, but minor, confronta-
tions with authority. It is also interesting to note that while those with
administrative records were calendared as if they had no record (Ta-
bles 79, 85), they were detained at rates almost as high as those persons
with prior records. (Table 25) It seems as if the calendaring and
detention officials placed different weight upon their paper records. Pol-
ice detained at high rates when persons had been previously arrested.
The Probation Department formalized often when prior records or
quick rearrests were present.
96. Interview with Judge Noden, Mercer County Juvenile Court, in Trenton, New
Jersey, May 7, 1971; Interview with Mr. Plumeri, Intake Officer at Mercer County
Probation Department in Trenton, New Jersey, Apr. 22, 1971; Interview with Ms.
Lynda Thistledon, Probation Officer, New Jersey, Apr. 22, 1971.
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There were also some differences between use of the formal calen-
dar for various types of crime, although the differences were clearly
evident only for minor offenders. (Table 86) This relationship be-
tween calendar and crime was not nearly as strong as that between
record and calendar. Not surprisingly, record overwhelmed the type
of crime as an important indicator of calendar. (Table 88) This fit
well with the picture previously described of the operation of the pro-
bation department in calendaring. It seemed that paper records, more
than individualized decisions based on a measurement of social danger,
governed calendaring.
Prior record also predominated as an indicator of calendar over vari-
ous perceptions of personal problems. While drug history was related
to calendaring, its effect dissipated when prior record was held con-
stant. (Tables 89, 90) Place of residence operated in a similar way.
(Tables 93, 94)
As mentioned previously, there was a drop off in the referral of older
juveniles to the court in Mercer County. (Table 3) This drop ap-
peared to have occurred among serious cases, or at least those that
might otherwise have been formalized. (Tables 91, 92) The reasons
for the failure of the Trenton Bureau to refer these persons to court
was not clear. The proffered explanations that the number of drug
and non-school attendance cases dropped for older juveniles could
plausibly sit with the calendaring data, since formalization was gener-
ally higher for drug and non-school cases. (Tables 89, 95)
The previously noted differences in detention for males and females
continued, somewhat altered, into the calendaring decision. While
males and females were calendared at similar rates (Table 96), which
similarity continued when prior record was held constant (Table 99),
female formalization occurred entirely among minor and juvenile status
offenders, where the male formalization rates were lower. (Table 98)
However, prior record data suggested that females should have been
formalized slightly more often among juvenile status and minor of-
fenders, and somewhat less often among medium offenders. (Table
100) This in fact occurred. (Table 98) The impact of prior record
appeared to dominate the use of calendars here as in other areas.
Large differences appeared in calendaring when race was consid-
ered. (Table 101) Again, the difference tended to disappear when
prior record was held constant. (Tables 102, 103, 105) The dif-
ferences in calendaring by race were largely confined to medium, and
perhaps serious, type crimes. This appeared in part because rearrests
before hearing were more likely to occur among Blacks in these groups
(Table 35), and because rearrest was strongly related to formalization.
The combination of prior record and rearrest data probably explained
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the racial calendaring differences. In summary, the probation depart-
ment's presence as calendaring agent had a substantial effect on calen-
daring. While differences in treatment by race and sex appeared, these
differences were not clearly out of phase with the rest of the data.
In general, the formal calendar was more heavily used in Essex than
in either Bergen or Mercer. (Table 78) This overall pattern was
consistent with the depth of general problems present in the three
samples. The high use of the formal calendar in Essex was also con-
sistent with the administrative mechanisms used to decide calendaring.
After a complaint arrived, the Juvenile Court Clerk separated out those
he would refer to Conference Committees. Such referrals were made,
as in the other counties, only for persons with no prior record. The
remaining files were docketed. Those where the juvenile was not in
custody were then kept by the clerk for calendaring while the remain-
der were sent to judges who calendared them at detention hearings.
This practice has not been significantly altered by the new detention
rules which simply require that continually detained cases be formal-
ized and that initial detention hearings occur within twenty-four
hours.97 Of those files remaining with the clerk for calendaring cases
defined as serious by the clerk (murder, rape, atrocious assault and bat-
tery, armed robbery, and hard drugs) were automatically formalized.
Cases where the clerk was not sure of which calendar to use were usually
formalized on the theory that the slightest possibility of institutionali-
zation in a case should lead to a formal hearing.98 This was consistent
with the high use of the formal calendar in Essex.
As in the other counties, a prior formal hearing almost always led to
a subsequent formal hearing. (Table 79) In general, those with prior
records were more likely to appear in formal hearings than those with
no prior records. In addition, formalization rose as the number of
prior adjudications rose. (Table 80) The Mercer pattern of a sharp
increase in formalization after one prior adjudication, followed by a lev-
eling off of formal calendar use, did not reappear. A sharp rise oc-
curred after three prior adjudications. Also, all cases with such lengthy
histories were formalized.
As in Mercer, there was a sharp jump in formalization for those re-
arrested before their hearings. Rearrested defendants were formalized
at twice the rate of those not rearrested. (Table 84) A rearrest had
almost the same impact as one prior adjudication. (Table 85) How-
ever, in contrast with Mercer, those with administrative records were
formalized at rates similar to those with prior records. (Tables 79, 85)
97. N.J.R. 5:8-20.
98. Interview with Mr. James Gozidlow, Juvenile Court Clerk of Essex County, in
Newark, New Jersey, Apr. 27, 1971.
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The clerk's presumptive use of the formal calendar seemed to carry ad-
ministrative record cases into the formal column in fairly large num-
bers; the use of the formal calendar rose to about half for all groups
having prior contact with the juvenile justice system.
It also appeared that there were significant differences between use of
the formal calendar and detention for various types of crime. (Table
86) The use of the formal calendar rose noticeably as cases progressed
from juvenile status offenses to serious offenses. Given this data, the
high use of detention among juvenile status offenders was anomalous.
In contrast to Mercer, where record was predominant, the impact of
crime and prior record on calendar was cumulative in Essex. (Table
88)
As indicated by the clerk, addictive drug history was highly re-
lated to formalization (Table 89) and cumulative in effect with prior
record. (Table 90) Place of residence was related to calendaring (Ta-
ble 93) but appeared to affect only those without prior records. (Ta-
ble 94) Similarly, older juveniles were formalized more often only if
they did not have a prior record. (Tables 91, 92) Thus, other than
drug history, factors relating to perceptions of personal difficulties were
quite secondary in their impact on calendaring to record and type crime.
Despite the fact that females and males were detained at fairly similar
rates, females were rarely formalized. (Table 96) Detained males
were formalized much more often than detained females. (Table 97)
The pattern continued for types of crime and prior record. (Tables 98,
99) The contrast with detention was remarkable. (See Tables 29,
72) Either more females were being detained, or fewer females were
being formalized, than was justified.
The contrast with detention was not as noteworthy when race was
considered. While Blacks were formalized more often (Table 101),
the difference tended to dissipate when prior record and crime was con-
sidered. (Tables 102, 103, 104, 105) Again note that Blacks were
more likely to have records, commit serious offenses, and have drug his-
tories.
The general trends noted here were confirmed by use of a point scale.
Altering the previous point system somewhat so that points were not
given for factors related to flight from the jurisdiction (bench warrant
use and residence out of state) but were given if the juvenile had two or
more prior adjudications, there was a significant difference in point lev-
els between calendars in all three counties. The presumptive use of the
informal calendar in Bergen and the formal in Essex may be reflected
in the fact that Bergen's formal cages had the highest median point
level and Essex's, the lowest, of the three counties. In addition, females
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and Blacks did not appear clearly mistreated on the basis of the scale
data. (Table 107)
C. The Adjudication Hearing
1. The Hearing. The study made use of five primary bits of data
on the adjudication itself: the nature of the legal representation, the
judge, the verdict, the existence of a remand for examinations pending
disposition and the length of time of the hearing from the filing of the
complaint. It has already been noted that, generally, detention was
fairly clearly related to calendaring and that cases with juveniles de-
tained pending hearing were heard quicker than other cases. (Tables
77, 60) Detention and calendaring had other interesting relationships
to the hearing. Clearly, detained cases obtained legal representation
more often because of the higher use of the formal calendar in those
cases. (Tables 108, 109) Note that public defenders generally could
not appear in informal cases and that the level of representation at in-
formal hearings was very low.
Of most interest, perhaps, were the relationships appearing between
detention, calendaring, and the verdict. As with judicial detention and
calendaring, different patterns appeared in each county. In Bergen
persons detained pending hearing had a higher guilty rate than other
juveniles. (Table 110) This continued regardless of prior record
(Table 112), crime (Table 113), number of charges pending against
the accused (Table 114), calendar (Table 115), place of residence
(Table 117), drug history (Table 118), attorney (Table 119), Judge
(Table 121), and time until hearing (Table 126). As one might ex-
pect with such a pattern, the data, though sparse, indicated that publicly
defended juveniles, who were often detained, were found guilty more
often than those privately defended. (Table 120) Overall, represented
juveniles fared a little better at verdict than those not represented by
counsel, especially in very long cases. (Tables 119, 124) The data
was too sparse to make any judgments about the comparative quality
of public and private defense.
It is interesting that much of the differential guilty rate appeared in
cases where attorneys were not present, though the pattern was present
in represented cases as well. (Table 119) In those cases tried with at-
torneys, delay was more likely; quick adjudications occurred more fre-
quently without lawyers. (Table 124) In fact, quick adjudications of
detained juveniles without counsel present, on the informal calendar,
contributed a substantial portion of the guilty verdicts. (Tables 126,
125, 123) Despite this initial flurry of informal adjudications, the guilt
differences for detained and non-detained persons continued for longer
cases. (Table 126) While it also appeared that the guilty rate fell in
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longer cases regardless of the presence of counsel (Table 124), or the
type of crime charged (Table 127), this effect dissipated when deten-
tion was held constant. (Table 126)
Two types of events are revealed by this data. First, a large batch of
cases were handled quickly, many after the juvenile was detained, on in-
formal calendars. It is unfortunate that the case files did not often re-
veal whether the adjudication occurred after guilty pleas. Second,
there was a more general pattern of differential guilty rates between
detained and non-detained cases. However, the degree of difference
was smaller for cases which took longer than one week to come to trial
(Table 126) and for cases with attorneys (Table 119) than the dif-
ference which occurred in the overall population. (Table 111) What-
ever bias was created by detention beyond a week in length was cer-
tainly less than that created by a police officer's initial decision to de-
tain. Those fortunate enough not to be initially detained were not con-
fronted with the initial gantlet of detention hearings (and, perhaps,
pressure to plead guilty in return for informal calendaring)"' and early
guilty findings.
Regardless of the exact course of events, it was clear that the initia-
tion of detention by the police and the continuance of that detention by
the court related to an ultimate finding of guilt. Such a fact makes the
detention decision of crucial importance and leads to added questioning
of Bergen's high detention rates and the large number of detained ju-
veniles adjudicated informally.
The differences in guilty rates for various detention situations which
appeared in the Bergen data did not appear so clearly in Mercer. (Ta-
ble 110) While there was a possibility that guilty rates were lowest for
those not detained in any way (Tables 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117,
118, 119, 122, 126), the differentials were sometimes nonexistent and
rarely large. The relative ease with which juveniles obtained release
from detention may indicate that the court did not in any way view the
detention process as important to the way a case was decided.
Whatever differentials did exist were most prominent between those
detained and released and those not detained. It is possible that the
manner in which detention was used by the police in Trenton caused
this data trend. If persons were most commonly released from deten-
tion only after police investigations were completed, these cases may be
more easily won by the state at trial. This theory was given some mild
support by data showing that, at high levels, the guilty rates leveled out
(about 95 per cent) among both those detained and released and those
not detained, in cases where several charges were pending against the
99. Present day experience as well as the study information indicates that such
pressure exists. See note 91 supra.
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juvenile. Differentials continued when two or less charges were pend-
ing. (Table 114) It is arguable that multiple charge cases were more
easily proven than others and that the presence of data showing high
uniform guilty rates for this entire group supports a theory that Mercer's
verdict statistics displayed differences primarily on the basis of the ease
with which cases could be proven. Again, it was unfortunate that guilty
plea data was not complete enough for statistical use.
The Mercer data only suggested possibilities. However, it is worth
noting that to whatever degree either possibility-bias created by de-
tention or detention used as an information collecting device--de-
scribed reality, safeguards are necessary. Detention decisions must be-
come more visible and actions taken to release juveniles must be sub-
ject to speedy review.
As in Bergen, privately represented juveniles fared better than others
(Table 120) and guilty rates declined for those represented by coun-
sel in cases lasting over three months. (Table 124) The sparse data
indicated that privately represented persons generally do better in crim-
inal and juvenile courts than do other persons, 100 but further research
would be necessary to confirm such a trend in New Jersey's juvenile
courts.
In Essex, the relationship between detention and guilt was dramati-
cally displayed in the data. The fall in guilty verdicts among non-
detained juveniles was very substantial. (Table 110) The large dif-
ferences continued regardless of prior record (Table 112), crime (Ta-
ble 113), number of charges pending against the juvenile (Table 114),
calendar (Table 115), rearrest (Table 116), place of residence (Table
117), attorney (Table 119), judge (Table 121), and race (Table
122). Only two small exceptions appeared in the data. Juveniles who
had addictive drug histories (Table 118) or who were tried fairly rap-
idly (Tables 124, 126, 127) were usually found guilty regardless of de-
tention status. The guilty rate fell in non-detention cases for non-ad-
dictive drug and non-drug defendants and for trials held more than one
month after arrest. Only about 12 percent (20/164) of the cases
were tried in less than one month. Thus, for most of the sample,
detention had a clear relationship to verdict.
Several explanations may exist for this pattern. First, a portion of
the cases were disposed of fairly quickly with a very high proportion of
guilty verdicts. These results involved both detained and non-detained
cases (Table 126), and represented and unrepresented juveniles (Ta-
ble 124), primarily in informal cases (Table 125); they probably in-
volved early guilty pleas. Again, it was unfortunate that the data did
not permit inquiry into pleas. Second, and most important, a degree of
100. See Banfield & Anderson, supra note 94.
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bias appeared to be created by the existence of detention in a case rec-
ord. The fact that the guilty rate for those detained and released was al-
most as high as that for those detained pending hearing indicated
that the difference in guilty rates resulted from something other than
"sub silentio" guilty findings at detention hearings or difficulty in
raising a defense due to total isolation from the community. Per-
haps detention created bias in the trier of fact, but regardless of the
exact cause, it was clear that detention was a crucial factor in the re-
sults of adjudication hearings. This fact was more clearly displayed by
Essex's data than by the data in the other counties.
2. Remands. Among those found guilty, remands for inpatient ex-
aminations were much more heavily used in Essex and Bergen Counties
than in Mercer. (Table 129) Generally, those detained were more
likely to be remanded than those not previously held. (Table 128)
However, the relative use of remands in the study counties was not
consistent with their relative use of detention or of the formal calendar.
(Compare Tables 20, 62, 78) The differences in the ways remands
were used were just as pronounced as with judicial detention.
In Bergen, 73 per cent (16/22) of those remanded had been de-
tained pending hearing; two more had been detained for shorter pe-
riods. In addition, many of those juveniles who were both detained
and remanded were adjudicated delinquents on the informal calendar.
(Table 128) Generally, remands occurred much more often among
those previously detained prior to an informal hearing than among all
others. Ten per cent (14/141) of all those found guilty were de-
tained pending hearing, adjudicated on the informal calendar and re-
manded. Such a pattern revealed a circumvention of the letter and
spirit of In re Gault"' of significant proportions. 02
Note that in Bergen, juvenile status offenders and parental com-
plaint juveniles were most likely to be remanded (Tables 130, 132),
and that the median length of time between adjudication and disposi-
tion for remanded persons was greater than one month. (Table 131)
The median length of time until disposition for others was less than a
week but about one-fourth of the cases dragged on longer than three
months. (Table 131) When pieced together with the other data
which displayed high detention rates and quick hearings without coun-
sel, there appeared a significant possibility that the remand procedure
was being used in Bergen as a device to deal with family disputes and
other minor cases in a quick, decisive, and probably illegal, fashion.
101. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
102. Presumably the Gault Court was concerned about the use of liberty decreasing
sanctions without procedural safeguards. Although Bergen may technically comply
with Gault, the number of institutionalizations without counsel indicates that the com-
pliance may be something other than enthusiastic.
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Some of the tendencies appearing in Bergen's detention data reap-
peared among those remanded but the relationships in the data were
generally not as strong. For example, females (Table 133), those not
in school (Table 134), those not living with both parents (Table
135), those with drug histories (Table 136), and those with prior rec-
ords (Table 137) were remanded more often. The judge made little
clear difference. (Tables 141, 143)
Using the point scale previously described for calendaring, and add-
ing another point to the scale for lack of presence in school, there was
only a small overall difference between those remanded and those not
remanded. (Table 140) This pattern reappeared for all types of
crime (Table 140) but for only one of the two judges. (Table 142)
Overall, it did appear that remands were used with somewhat less dis-
crimination than detention, and certainly with less selectivity than the
formal calendar.
While informal cases were more likely to be remanded in Bergen, in
Mercer, the overall remand rate was low (Table 129), formal cases
were remanded slightly more often than informal cases and detention
was only slightly more likely to lead to a remand. (Table 128) Re-
mands were much more likely to occur among serious and juvenile
status offenders than among others. (Table 130) The median time
from adjudication to disposition in remanded cases was extraordinary-
longer than three months. Other cases were disposed of much more
rapidly. (Table 131)
The gross number of remands was so low that data analysis was
difficult. However, a few bits of data did indicate some standards.
For example, females and juveniles from split families were remanded
more often. (Tables 133, 135) Generally, no clear difference
in the use of remands appeared for other factors. Using the point
system previously described, there was little difference between those
remanded, sent for outpatient work or routinely disposed of. (Table
140) No point difference existed between males and females. (Table
139) The small amount of data made definite conclusions impossible.
In Essex, calendaring had no apparent impact on the remand deci-
sion. (Table 128) While most remands (74 per cent, 25/34) oc-
curred in formal cases, a significant proportion (26 per cent) occurred
after informal hearings. While the detain-informalize-remand pattern
present in Bergen did not occur in as high a proportion of cases in Es-
sex, remands did occur at similar rates among informal cases. (Table
128) Generally, all cases were disposed of in less than a month after
adjudication, but remanded cases got a slower start toward disposition.
(Table 131) While Essex's adjudications took longer than the other
counties, their dispositions moved more quickly.
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Several of the trends evident in initial detention reappeared in Es-
sex's remand data. Juvenile status offenders were the most likely to
be remanded though serious offenders were also remanded at a high
rate. (Table 130) The same pattern appeared among parental com-
plaint and other cases. (Table 132) Males (Table 139), those from
split families (Table 135), those with drug histories (Table 136), those
with prior records (Table 137), and Blacks (Table 138) were more
likely to be remanded.
These patterns were confirmed by the point scale which showed
males and Blacks with more points (Table 139) and remanded persons
with more points than non-remanded persons. (Table 140) In gen-
eral, remands appeared to be used with somewhat greater distinctions
in Essex than in the other counties.
However, there were still two difficulties with Essex's remand proc-
ess. First, though the data was sparse, it appeared that the high re-
mand rate for juvenile status offenders was not justified on the point
scale. (Table 140) Second, remand procedures appeared to be quite
differently used by various judges in the county. (Table 141) Re-
mand rates ranged from 14 per cent to 50 per cent among the judges.
Point scaling confirmed the notion that judges were using quite differ-
ent remand policies. (Table 142) Of those judges with the lowest
use of remands, it was possible that one (#3) didn't care to use the
remedy, and another (#4) didn't have a population with sufficient
problems to call for a high use of remands. One judge (#2) ap-
peared to use remands out of proportion to the demands of his case-
load. These same trends reappeared when the judges' actions were
broken down by calendar. (Table 143) Two judges (#1, #4) ap-
peared to use remands regularly in formal cases, another (#3) just
didn't use remands, and the other judge (#2) regularly used remands
off the informal calendar. Judge #2's use of informal remands is
subject to criticisms already discussed as to Bergen's overall remand
pattern.
D. The Disposition
The use of state juvenile institutions was clearly the exception not
the rule in all three counties. (Table 148) Two other dispositions as-
sumed slightly more significance: dispositions imposing residential,
non-home, conditions on probations, and fines. As mentioned pre-
viously, probation with residential conditions is a most serious disposi-
tion. Generally, this disposition was more likely to occur after formal
adjudications than after informals but a portion of informal cases were
disposed of in this manner in all three counties. (Table 149) These
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dispositions are subject to serious questions of legality. 1° 3 Fines oc-
curred with most frequency in Bergen, with a significant portion (17
per cent, 25/141) of informal cases being disposed of in this way.
Their heavy use in Bergen was probably attributable to the wealth of
the county, in comparison with the other sample areas.
The interplay between the ultimate disposition and prior events in
the juvenile justice process was most interesting. Generally, those de-
tained pending hearing, placed on the formal calendar, or remanded
were more likely to receive serious dispositions than others. (Tables
144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150) However, the relationships were dif-
ferent in each county, with detention and remand assuming importance
in Bergen, detention and calendaring in Mercer, and detention, calen-
daring, and remands in Essex.
The relationship of calendar to disposition was the least significant in
Bergen County. (Tables 145, 147) The impact of detention dissi-
pated the effect of calendar on dispositions (Tables 145, 149) and the
presence of a remand was more crucial than the calendar in the deter-
mination of a serious disposition. (Table 147) The overall effect of
calendaring on the actual outcome was quite small in the Bergen sam-
ple, while that of detention (Tables 145, 150, 153) and remands (Ta-
bles 144, 146, 147) was quite significant. The interplay of Bergen's
court processing and individual factors, such as crime, drug use, family
status, and prior record confirmed the impact of the process on its own
outcome. For example, both prior record and detention were related
to disposition. (Tables 150, 152) But their impacts were cumula-
tive (Table 153), indicating that detention itself may have had an inde-
pendent effect. Crime (Table 155) and family status (Table 166) op-
erated in much the same way with detention; detention appeared to dis-
sipate any effect drug history may have had on dispositions. (Table
165)
Note carefully that wide scale use of remands in Bergen occurred
after informal hearings, that remanded persons were given serious dis-
positions more often (Table 144) and that informally adjudicated ju-
veniles who had been remanded were seriously disposed of at much
higher rates than those not remanded after informal adjudications.
(Table 147) This, together with the relationship of pre-trial deten-
tion to post-trial remanding and ultimate dispositions (Table 146) ne-
gated the overall importance of the calendaring decision in Bergen
County, except that it provided a neat vehicle for avoiding the restric-
tions of Gault. It is possible that the provision of counsel in all infor-
mal hearings would alter the results of these cases (see Tables 123, 124)
and thereby realign the juvenile justice system of Bergen County.
103. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
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In contrast to Bergen, remanded cases were not the most likely to re-
ceive serious dispositions in Mercer. (Table 144) The manner in
which calendaring faded as a significant factor in the operation of the
Bergen court in comparison with detention did not appear in Mercer,
where both detention and calendaring contributed to the seriousness of
the ultimate dispositions. (Tables 145, 146, 147) The cumulative im-
pact of detention and calendaring on receipt of a serious disposition ap-
peared to be quite substantial. (Tables 145, 149, 150) Serious dis-
positions occurred much more frequently on the formal calendar than
the informal, though there still was a fairly significant use of serious
dispositions in informal cases. (Table 149) But most important, the
processing steps of detention and calendaring were more influential
than prior record or other factors at the disposition stage. While those
with prior records, especially serious ones, were more likely to be seri-
ously disposed of than others (Tables 152, 158, 159), detention pend-
ing hearing and calendaring each had impacts independent of prior rec-
ord. (Tables 153, 154) Crime, drug use, and family status data ap-
peared to operate in the same way. (Tables 155, 165, 166)
In Essex, all three procedural steps appeared to effect dispositions.
Remanded cases were much more likely to be seriously disposed of than
other cases. (Table 144) It also appeared that both detention and
calendaring were related to dispositions and that the relationship of de-
tention, calendaring, and remands to dispositions were cumulative.
(Tables 145, 146, 147) In addition, the impact of detention and calen-
dar was cumulative with prior record. (Tables 153, 154) Crime
(Table 156) and drug use (Table 165) operated in a similar fashion
with detention.
The overall disposition patterns varied considerably among the study
counties. For example, in Bergen and Mercer, juvenile status offend-
ers received serious dispositions quite often (Table 151), while in Es-
sex, such persons rarely were seriously disposed of. Though prior rec-
ord affected dispositions fairly clearly in all three counties (Table
152), juvenile status offenders were seriously disposed of in Bergen
at high rates regardless of prior record. (Table 156) This occurred
even though juvenile status offenders were rarely formalized. (Table
86) Furthermore, in Bergen, juveniles in parental complaint cases
were seriously disposed of more often than others. (Table 157; con-
trast Mercer and Essex) As in status offense cases, the formalization
rate of parental complaint cases was not higher than other cases. (Ta-
ble 87) Such data reemphasized the relative unimportance of calen-
daring in the Bergen process. In Mercer, record overwhelmed crime
as an important factor in dispositions in all crime categories; the same
trend appeared in Essex but only for serious and medium offenders.
(Table 156) The contrast among the three counties in the impact of
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record and crime on dispositions was stark. Bergen and Essex were al-
most opposites. Mercer relied almost exclusively on record as a basis
for dispositional decisions, much as it did for calendaring. (Table
156)
The impact of prior record was somewhat specialized in all three
counties. Just as a prior formal calendaring had a significant impact
on a subsequent calendaring decision, so prior serious dispositions were
related to subsequent serious dispositions. The court imposed sanc-
tions more serious than those last ordered at fairly low rates, especially
when moving from medium or minor to serious dispositions. (Table
158) Usually, a juvenile had at least two prior adjudications before
serious dispositions were used; in Essex, the number rose to three.
(Table 159)
Other relationships between perceptions of social and personal dan-
ger and dispositions also existed. Those with drug histories received
more serious dispositions than those without such histories (Table 162)
and those out of school were more likely to be seriously dealt with.
(Table 164) As might be expected, family status was also related to
dispositions. Those not living with both parents were treated more
severely than those living with both parents. (Table 168) The effect
of family status and prior record were cumulative (Table 173), ex-
cept in Essex, where the effect of family status dissipated. In a now
familiar pattern, the impact of a family situation was most concen-
trated among minor and juvenile status offenders in Bergen while juve-
nile status offenders were seriously disposed of at high rates for all fam-
ily situations. (Table 174) Essex presented the opposite pattern and
family status appeared to affect all crime categories in Mercer. (Ta-
ble 174)
Perhaps some of the data differences were explained by the way age
affected outcomes. Younger persons were more likely to be seriously
treated in Bergen than their older counterparts, while the opposite was
true in Essex. Mercer was somewhere between. (Table 163) The
possibility of age cutting two ways (youth equals either vulnerability
or lack of fault) appeared vividly.
Racial and sexual differences also appeared in the data. Females
continued to be treated more severely in Mercer, as were Blacks in
Mercer and Essex. (Tables 160, 161) Female lesser offenders re-
ceived serious dispositions much more often than males in Mercer (Ta-
ble 172), without prior records (Table 171) or higher point scaling
(Table 176) to fully explain the disparity. The racial differences
tended to dissipate when crime (Table 169), prior record (Table
168), and point scales (Table 176) were considered.
Overall, there were significant differences between serious, medium
and minor disposition cases. Point differences for various dispositions
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were substantial for all types of crime, except in Bergen for juvenile
status offenders. (Table 177) Blacks and females were not clearly
unfairly treated. (Table 176) In contrast to the remand pattern, no-
ticeable differences in dispositions did not appear among the judges in
Essex. (Table 178)
E. Note on Treatment of Females
As already discussed, the Mercer sample revealed a fairly persistent
trend of severe treatment of females. One final attempt to explain this
trend is in order. It is a rational hypothesis to say that females are
more likely to be charged with offenses relating to sexual behavior than
males and that such offenses may be treated severely by the judicial
process. In fact, an extraordinary proportion of females in Mercer were
charged with sex related conduct. (Table 179) The contrast with
Essex was remarkable. Mercer's differential treatment by sex in de-
tention (Table 180), calendaring (Table 181), and disposition (Table
182) did tend to dissipate when sex crimes were considered. While
this may have explained the persistent trends in the data, it also raised
serious questions about both the practices of prosecuting authorities and
the severity with which such cases were treated by the court. Sexual
misbehavior is likely to be dangerous only when undertaken by males in
violent circumstances. The data revealed here indicated significant
possibilities of unfair treatment of females.
F. Note on City and Suburb
Generally, juveniles in Mercer and Essex Counties were processed
by county wide institutions.10 4  Overall, the data reflected this fact.
Despite vast apparent differences in treatment between city and suburb
(Table 185, Essex), there were few differences which survived when
point scales were used. (Tables 183, 186, 187, 188)
Only one interesting problem area survived the data analysis, and
that in an area not covered by a county wide unit. While detained and
non-detained cases displayed wide point differences in both Newark
and the rest of Essex County (Table 183) and most variables had simi-
lar effects in both areas, family status did not follow the general trend.
Juveniles from split homes were more likely to be detained only in the
suburban areas. (Table 184) It did appear possible that the Newark
Youth Aid Bureau paid less attention than their suburban counterparts
or the court (Compare Table 70) to an arrestee's family situation in
making detention decisions. The possibility was given further support
by data on the nature of the complainant. Detention rates were vir-
104. Bergen is not discussed here. It lacks large cities.
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tually the same in Newark for cases where a parent was the complain-
ant or where other persons complained. (Table 189; compare Tren-
ton)
G. Summary
While many of the data trends were totally rational, problem areas
of some significance appeared. The Bergen data revealed two basic
abuses running through the entire system. First, juvenile status of-
fenders were detained, remanded and seriously disposed of at very high
rates without use of the formal calendar. Second, the use of the in-
formal calendar, often with juvenile status offenders and often in close
connection with detention and remands was highly questionable.
These practices are not totally avoided by the new detention rules which
leave courts free to informally adjudicate those not judicially detained.
Should the court decide to turn detention hearings into adjudication
hearings, the same practices could continue. This data indicated a
need for prevention of remand and residential probations after informal
calendar hearings, and perhaps for the entire abolition of the calendar
distinction.
While the fairly glaring procedural abuses of the Bergen data did not
appear in Mercer, several problems have been noted. First, the deten-
tion and release decisions were centralized in the police and probation
departments. Little review of those processes occurred and the ulti-
mate decision as to release, and perhaps as to initial detention, often ap-
peared unrelated to traditional detention rationales. In addition, dif-
ferent standards were clearly applied to the detention and release de-
cisions. Second, the Probation Department's calendaring process
(also largely unreviewed by the court) and the final dispositional de-
cisions revealed distinctions made largely on the basis of prior history,
rather than on any other factor. There was a noticeable tendency to
give only one bite at the apple before formalization or two bites before
incarceration. Third, the overall treatment of females in this sample
was difficult to justify. Fourth, as in Bergen, this data indicated the
need for legal checks on the early procedural steps in a delinquency
case. Detention and calendaring were closely related to the ultimate
verdict and disposition, despite the fact that they were virtually unre-
viewed by the courts and unattended by counsel.
Finally, several problems were revealed in Essex. First, juvenile
status offenders were detained at rates which seemed out of proportion
to the need. Second, judicial differences in detention and remand pol-
icy were clearly displayed. Such differences go to the heart of a juve-
nile's journey through the court system. Third, detention and calen-
daring had large influences on later stages of the proceedings despite
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the lack of any strong legal safeguards at these stages. Fourth, and
perhaps most important, the proportion of guilty verdicts was clearly
higher for detained persons. The entrance of such extraneous factors
into the adjudication process is unfortunate and unnecessary.
IV. CONCLUSION
The study revealed many inequities in the juvenile court processes in
Bergen, Mercer and Essex Counties; several patterns repeated them-
selves in all three areas. For example, though the pattern was proba-
bly explainable, Blacks were more severely treated. Females were
handled differently than males, especially at the detention level. At
times these differences were unjustifiable. The significant use of sex-
ual offense prosecutions against females in Mercer, and the serious
treatment of females by the Mercer court, should be the subject of a
special review.
Two other trends went to the heart of the problems with the existing
juvenile court structure. First, juvenile status offenders were treated
fairly severely at all levels of the system, without any clear justification
for such treatment. Second, the judicial process had significant impacts
on its own outcomes. While the exact nature of the impacts varied
among the counties, detention, calendaring and remanding each had
independent effects on verdicts and dispositions in various situations.
In this last section of the study, these two problems are reviewed and
recommendations for change are made.
A. Juvenile Status Offenders
As mentioned in the opening section of this study, the juvenile de-
linquency statute of New Jersey creates an extremely broad definition
of delinquency.' 0 5  This study indicated that numerous avenues of
abuse were opened by this statute. Despite the fact that juvenile status
offenders' behavior represented no danger to the community, and little
danger to the juveniles themselves, detention, remands, and serious dis-
positions were commonly used with this class of defendants, especially
where a parent was the complaining party. These results are ripe for
review and challenge.
The opening round in the review has already been fired. A com-
mittee of the New Jersey State Bar Association has proposed a revision
of the juvenile statute calling for the creation of a new class of juve-
niles, persons in need of supervision (PINS). The class is defined to
include:
1. A juvenile who is habitually disobedient to the lawful commands
105. See notes 10-16 supra and accompanying text.
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of his parent or guardian when such disobedience makes him ungov-
ernable or incorrigible, or
2. A juvenile who is habitually and voluntarily truant, or
3. A juvenile who has committed an offense applicable only to ju-
veniles.' 0 6
This proposal is borrowed in part from existing statutes of several other
states.0 7 The proposed act restricts arrest of PINS by requiring a
court order for custody,0 8 requires that custody of PINS be only in
shelter care facilities,' 0 9 and limits dispositions to non-incarcerative sit-
uations.110
This proposal is certainly an improvement over the present situation.
The PINS section is narrower than the present juvenile code sections
which make such "behavior" as immorality, associating with thieves or
vicious or immoral persons, growing up in idleness and delinquency,
and idly roaming the streets at night, delinquent."' In addition, PINS
would be separated from more serious delinquents at all stages of the
process and detention would theoretically occur only in facilities de-
signed for non-delinquent children. Finally, the court would be forced
to seek non-institutional dispositions for PINS.
Despite these improvements, it seems preferable to eliminate all ju-
venile court jurisdiction over conduct not criminal for adults. The
PINS proposal deals with several types of young persons, juveniles
having serious differences with their families, young persons not attend-
ing school and non-adult offenders (primarily local curfew violators).
There is little reason to retain any of these groups, especially the first
two, within the juvenile code.
The PINS proposal continues the existing duplication between de-
linquency and the jurisdiction of the Domestic Relations Court and the
Bureau of Children's Services (BCS) over neglected and dependent
children." 2  The tools available to BCS appear more than adequate to
handle cases involving serious familial disagreements. Police, schools,
or other interested persons may seek the intervention of BCS to provide
care and custody whenever the welfare of a child "will be endangered
unless proper care or custody is provided," and the needs of that child
106. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 15, § 2A:4-45.
107. See ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 37, § 702-3 (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.Y. FAMILY Cr.
AcT § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1972). See also ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 37, 9H 702-4,
702-5 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
108. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 15, § 2A:4-54.
109. Id. § 2A:4-56(b), (c).
110. Id. § 2A:4-62. The only exceptions to the general rule are for retarded or
mentally ill PINS.
111. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-14 (Supp. 1972), amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:
4-14 (1952).
112. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-11, 12 (1964). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-
15 (guardianship), 4C-26.1-.7 (Foster Home or Institution) (1964).
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cannot be met by use of financial assistance programs or placement
with a person legally responsible for support."'
The availability of this jurisdiction indicates that no void would be
created by deleting delinquency or PINS jurisdiction over those with
family problems. In addition, the juvenile court has a reputation as a
youthful criminal court. Using that type of institution to solve family
disputes seems much less desirable than using an organization de-
signed primarily to handle family difficulties. While this study did not
review the viability of the programs of BCS, in principle, it is better to
make use of non-labeling social service programs than delinquency dis-
positions for non-dangerous youth. Should BCS programs be inade-
quate, the solution is not to look to the juvenile court but to a restruc-
turing of programs available to non-delinquent youths.
Truancy cases also are better left outside the juvenile court's jurisdic-
tion. The carrot seems much more appropriate than the stick as a de-
vice to stem the tide of school absence. Good schools or programs,
created to deal imaginatively with difficult or perhaps bright, but un-
challenged, youngsters may be more likely to foster attendance than
judicial decrees.' In addition, should any particular juvenile be in
serious difficulty, BCS jurisdiction is available.
Finally, curfew violations or other offenses against local ordinances
are almost always minor. The Bar Association proposal, and most
other definitions of delinquency, appear to include such offenses within
the delinquency jurisdiction of the juvenile court." 5 The effect of the
Bar proposals is to reduce the grade of curfew, and similar violations,
to cases where confinement is not possible. That goal is laudable. The
only remaining issue is whether the state statute should remove local
authority to pass curfew ordinances or accommodate them. The an-
swer is not clear but it is certainly possible that curfew ordinances are
only relevant to children who stay out late because their homes are
either psychologically or physically unpleasant. In the former situa-
tion, social service, rather than juvenile court, seems appropriate. In
the second case, the answer is not to arrest people for violating curfew
but to build better houses. In any case, the Bar Association proposals
represent a marked improvement over the existing statute. While the
proposed revision would not remove all inequities, it is clear that half
a loaf would be far superior to no loaf at all.
B. Inequities of the Process
Two of the objectives of any judicial system should be to treat simi-
113. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-11 (1964).
114. See Schreiber, Juvenile Delinquency and the School Dropout Problem, 27 FED.
PROBATION, Sept. 1963, at 15 and sources cited therein.
115. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 15, § 2A:4-44(a)(3).
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lar persons similarly and to minimize the impact of the process itself
on the outcomes of factual and legal disputes. Many differences in
treatment among the study counties at all levels of the process includ-
ing prosecution, have already been noted. In addition, a series of the
system's effects upon itself have been described. While control of case
flow through the normal exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the
judicious application of court rules is bound to have some inequitable
effects, such effects should be minimized. Although the hypothetical
model system envisioned earlier"' might channel the same types of per-
sons through detention, formal calendars, remands and serious disposi-
tions, that model did not envision that detention, formalization, re-
mands or procedural methods would have dispositional effects unre-
lated to each case's factual foundations.
Much data indicated that procedural steps had significant independ-
ent effects on later outcomes. For example, the three counties re-
leased juveniles from detention pending hearing at extraordinarily dif-
ferent rates. (Table 62) These differences had no relation to the
severity of the problems present in each sample population. (Compare
Table 19) The conclusion is inescapable that the administrative meth-
ods of the police, the Probation Departments and the courts had extra-
ordinary effects on the outcomes of the detention decisions. In some
cases, especially in Essex, the judge sitting caused wide variations in
practice.
Similarly, calendaring varied widely between the counties (Table
78) and much of this difference was related to administrative proce-
dures rather than to the merits of the cases. Some persons calendaring
presumed that the formal calendar should be used, others, the informal.
(Compare Essex and Bergen) Administrative mechanisms may have
caused over-reliance on one set of factual parameters. (See Table
80) These differences had profound effects later in the judicial proc-
ess. Informalization led to higher use of remands in some areas, (Ta-
ble 128) and formalization to greater use of serious dispositions in all
three counties. (Tables 147, 149)
Other distortions also appeared. Detention of any type had effects
on the outcomes of adjudication hearings, especially in Essex County.
(Table 111) Differences among judges caused variations in remand
use. (Table 141) Detention and remand each had effects on the use
of serious dispositions. (For example, see Tables 153, 155) These
examples, together with the host of differences in the application of
standards noted in Section III, create great challenges to those inter-
ested in uniformly fair treatment in the state's juvenile courts. Below
116. Introduction, Section M, supra.
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are recommendations for dealing with some of the problems in deten-
tion, calendaring, remands and dispositions.
Detention problems are of three types. First, there are difficulties
in the standards that should be applied in making detention decisions.
Second, regardless of the standards to be applied, they must be uni-
formly and fairly applied by the police and the courts. Third, the im-
pact of detention on the defendant's ultimate fate must be minimized.
Parts of these problems have already been discussed. Juvenile status
offenders create vast detention problems in all three areas. Removing
the possibility of arrest without court order and of detention in delin-
quency facilities, as in the Bar Association proposals, goes some way
toward meeting this problem. In addition, the requirement, under the
new detention rules, that hearings be held within twenty-four hours,"1
removes the ability of police to hold detainees without regard to judicial
sanction.
The problems of standards still remain. They are highlighted by the
Bar Association proposals which restrict detention of delinquents to
cases where it is necessary either "to secure the presence of the juvenile
at the next hearing" or "to protect the physical safety of the commu-
nity,"' 8 but permit placement of PINS in shelters when "shelter
care is necessary to protect the juvenile," "the juvenile had no par-
ent, guardian, or other persons able to provide supervision and care,"
or "shelter care is necessary to secure his presence at the next hear-
ing." 9  The present ability to detain when the juvenile is dangerous
to himself' is restricted in these proposals to shelter care for PINS.
The ambiguous nature of the danger-to-self standard is revealed not
only by the bifurcated Bar Association standard but also by this study.
For example, the sample counties treated drug history cases differently
(Tables 37, 38), with Essex being much less concerned with non-ad-
dictive cases than the other counties. Differences in treatment accord-
ing to school status also appeared. (Tables 42, 43) Place of resi-
dence had a less noticeable effect in Essex, especially in Newark, than
in the other samples. (Tables 49, 51, 184) While it is not surprising
that police in an area of serious problems (Newark) should be less con-
cerned with factors creating perceptions of personal difficulty than with
indicators of social danger, the data differences also emphasized the
logical scale of values that should be applicable in a preventive deten-
tion situation. Assuming that money bail is inappropriate for juveniles,
it is certainly arguable that the major concerns for detention purposes
117. N.J.R. 5:8-2(d)(2).
118. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 15, § 2A:4-56(b).
119. Id. § 2A:4-56(c).
120. N.J.R. 5:8-2(b)(2), 5:8-6(e)(2).
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are protection of society and appearance at hearing. Other factors re-
late not so much to the viability of the judicial process as to the rehab-
ilitative purposes that the courts assume upon adjudication of delin-
quency.
It is now appropriate to restate an earlier point. Non-institutional
methods of pre-trial care may be useful in many cases, especially those
involving PINS or similar inividuals. The Bar Association proposals
open the possibility for such care by defining shelter care to include
"the temporary care of juveniles in physically unrestricting facilities
pending court disposition" and by restricting shelter care placements to
foster homes and children's shelters.' 2' However, the code does not
emphasize the possibility of non-custodial care as the preferred choice.
Creation of such a preference, especially for PINS cases, might ease
the practical difficulties of using an ambiguously relevant detention
standard by creating a broader spectrum of preferred non-custodial
situations for pre-trial care. It must be noted that the Bar Association
detention proposals are much like the powers presently granted BCS,
122
and that BCS would probably become a major placement agency should
the Bar proposals be enacted and actively used. 12 3  This only reempha-
sizes the dubious nature of the need for PINS jurisdiction or for deten-
tion of persons dangerous to self.
The uniform application of vague standards is necessarily difficult.
However, certain actions should be taken to improve the existing situa-
tion, other than the requirement of immediate hearing and preference
for non-custodial community based care. In order to fulfill the stated
preference for not using detention of any kind in delinquency and
PINS cases, 124 police should be required, perhaps by use of affidavits,
to file with the court or detention facility, prior to the juvenile's admis-
sion into custody, a detailed statement of the efforts made to place the
juvenile after arrest. Failure to file or to undertake any placement ef-
forts should automatically prevent confinement.' 25  The apparent fail-
ure of Newark area police to undertake such searches on a wide scale
121. PROPOSE] CODE, supra note 15, §§ 2A:4-43(e), 2A:57(b). The language is
broad enough to encompass many forms of community based living arrangements.
122. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-26.1, 4C-26.2 (Supp. 1972).
123. Though BCS now has the authority to make short term juvenile court place-
ments, heavy reliance on BCS for such placements would not be possible under existing
circumstances since placements presently take months to complete at the disposition
stage. Under court or legislative pressure BCS might well develop placement resources
specifically designed for short term court needs.
124. N.J.R. 5:8-2(b), 5:8-6(e); PROPOSED CODE, supra note 15, § ZA:4-56(a).
125. The present rules require a filing of a statement, N.J.R. 5:8-2(c), but the only
consequence of the filing is to require release should an adult custodian appear in a
case where the only stated reason for detention is the inability to find such a guardian.
No apparent consequences attach to failure to file or in circumstances where the police
efforts to find custodians were something less than full.
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basis (See Tables 184, 189) should be remedied by such a rule. In
addition, judicial tendencies to confine at high rates (See Table 62,
Bergen; Tables 74, 75, 76, Judge #2) would be limited by such a rule
to cases where the papers were properly filed.
In addition, attorneys should be present at the earliest possible point
in all cases involving detention,'12 evidence, other than court files and
hearsay statements, justifying detention should be required in all cases
to continue restraint, and judges should be required to state on the
record the reasons for confining, instead of releasing or placing a
juvenile in a non-custodial setting. Both these steps should be useful
devices to reduce differences in treatment. Opening the juvenile
court process to scrutiny by persons outside the court itself, including
appellate judges, is one method of attempting to leaven differences
in treatment currently hidden from view.
Finally, the impact of detention on later court activity must be mini-
mized. Under present procedure, detention requires formalization and
the overall impact of detention is quite significant. Some of the sug-
gestions already made would reduce the use of total detention and
thereby lessen its effect. Of most interest would be a future study of
the relationship between non-custodial pre-trial restriction and ultimate
case results. One further step is worth taking. The impact of deten-
tion in Essex was not entirely related to the difficulties of proof cre-
ated by detention. (See Table 114) Some bias was apparently cre-
ated by the mere fact of detention. One method of reducing that bias
is to remove all indications of detention from the file before it goes to
the adjudication hearing while insuring that detainees and non-detain-
ees enter the courtroom in exactly the same way. A study of the im-
pact of such actions should be undertaken.
As mentioned above, differences in calendaring practices appeared
in this study. Although some differences were substantial (For exam-
ple, see Tables 79, 81, 88), it was clear that calendaring acted as a
fairly significant filtering device. (See Table 106) The effects of cal-
endaring were also varied. In Bergen and Essex, remands were more
likely in informal cases. (Tables 128, 143) Serious dispositions were
more likely in formal cases in all three counties but the overall effect
of calendaring on dispositions in Bergen was small. It is not too diffi-
126. This recommendation is in partial operation in some counties. The double de-
tention hearing system called for by the present detention rules has been altered by
having counsel present at first detention hearings; the two hearings are simply merged.
The duplication of the rules is avoided and counsel enters the case within twenty-four
hours of its appearance in the juvenile court. Movement of counsel back further in the
process is difficult without the cooperation of the youth divisions of police depart-
ments or intake personnel at detention facilities. Even under present circumstances,
the lack of staff at the Public Defenders' offices and the unavailability or non-existence
of files at first detention hearings makes the legal representation sporadic or shoddy.
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cult to conclude that the calendaring system is deficient. First, calen-
daring creates an invisible decision point where differences in handling
may arise. Second, the ability to use confinement, whether it be ninety
day remands or institutional probations, after informal hearings, re-
moves the gloss of constitutionality now protecting informal hearings.
The issue is whether to patch up the calendaring system, replace it with
a satisfactory alternative, or abolish it.
At a minimum, safeguards must be established to prevent the use of
any remanding procedure in informal cases. The rationales of recent
court action extending the right to counsel in all adult cases where any
incarceration may result' 2 7 may well apply to juvenile courts. In addi-
tion, the possibility that remands may become a punishment device in-
dicates that the presence of counsel in remand cases is critical. Further-
more, judges should be required, as in detention, to state on the record
their reasons for use of the remand process and the facts justifying such
a commitment.
The remaining question is whether the opportunity provided by the
calendaring decision for differential treatment is significant enough to
outweigh the advantages of the calendaring system. Informal calen-
dars maintain a more traditional juvenile court format, which to many
is a virtue. The device also saves the state a considerable sum of
money that would otherwise be used to staff public defender offices
for handling all juvenile court cases of the indigent. While the stated
advantages of the calendaring system do not seem terribly significant
in theory, there is no question that the present public defense systems in
populous areas would be extremely overburdened if all informal cases
were added to their loads. Even if the calendaring system were abol-
ished, it would probably have to be replaced by some other device to
filter very minor cases out of the public defense system.
The alternatives are not numerous. Even if not forced to do so by
judicial decree, the state could establish probable cause hearings for ju-
veniles.' 28 However, such hearings might intensify whatever biased re-
lationships presently exist between detention and ultimate findings of
guilt, and would, in any case, eliminate bad evidentiary cases but not
minor or petty cases from the public defense load. Even under the
Bar Association proposals, many minor offenses would still provide
grounds for delinquency, as opposed to PINS, prosecutions. The best
alternative is to state standards for formalization, open the calendaring
decision to scrutiny by requiring the decision to be made on the record
with reasons stated and restrict the use of detention and remands in
informal cases.
127. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
128. See notes 24-28 supra and accompanying text.
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The basic standards could be created by using the detention stand-
ards for delinquency prosecutions but without regard to likelihood of
flight from the jurisdiction. Though the standard of social danger is
vague, it, together with openly stated reasons for calendaring, provides
some basis upon which to standardize decisions, and, especially in for-
mal cases, provides trial counsel with rationales for his client's predica-
ment. Additional methods of creating uniformity in calendaring are
also available. Use of the formal hearing could be prohibited for first
offenders or for those with one prior adjudication, not charged with
violent assaultive behavior or other very serious offenses. Such a
standard would also create limits on judicial detention. Under a stand-
ard prohibiting use of the formal calendar for those without prior rec-
ords, the change in present detention systems in the study counties
would not be great, except for juveniles in Bergen and for juvenile
status offenders in all three counties (See Tables 25, 28, 62, 63). The
change in calendaring decisions would be very small. (Tables 79, 88)
A one-prior-adjudication standard would have more impact, espe-
cially in Mercer and Essex. (Table 81) While the overall impact of
a no-record standard might be small, it would eliminate any existing ex-
tremes in behavior and fix a general standard for the entire state.
The problems with dispositions were of two basic types. First, there
was a problem with institutional probations. Second, the procedural
steps of remand and detention had independent effects on disposi-
tions. The first of these is easily handled by simply forbidding the use
of custodial probation sentences in informal hearings. The steps al-
ready suggested will handle much of the remaining difficulty. Lessen-
ing the use of total detention, removing indicators of detention from
case files and controlling the use of remands and formal calendars
would result in channeling cases in a somewhat different stance to dis-
position hearings.
The largest problem with dispositions is one not studied here, the
availability of a wide range of treatment alternatives. It is only fitting
that a study of a process end on a note asking for more disposition
choices. While most juveniles processed through the courts are not in-
stitutionalized, the most serious cases may require the most care and
attention. Much of the juvenile crime is committed by young persons
with prior judicial scrutiny. Regardless of the fact that the fairness and
uniformity of the court process is basic to dispositional decisions, there
is still a crying need for dispositional alternatives capable of reducing
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TABLE 1-SEX*
Rest of Rest of
Trenton Mercer Newark Essex
80% 81% 83% 75%
137/ 39/ 131/ 41/
/171 /48 158 /55
20% 19% 17% 25%
34/ 27/ 14/
/171 9/48 /158 /55
this and all subsequent tables is based upon place of resi-
It should also be noted that the proportion of Newark
4%, 158/223) conforms precisely to court statistics for 1970.
TABLE 2-RACE
Rest of Rest of
Trenton Mercer Newark Essex
27% 67% 12% 59%
46/ 28/ 17/ 3%/
/169 /42 /142 5
68% 33% 80% 41%
115/ 14 114/ 21/
/169 /42 /142 /51
5% 0% 8% 0%
8/ /42"/4 0//19 0/2 /51
2 6 17 4
TABLE 3-AGE*
Rest of Rest of
Trenton Mercer Newark Essex
10% 9% 3% 4%
16/ 4/ 5/ 2/
165 /44 /153 /54
15% 20% 17% 22%
25/ 9/ 26/ 12/54
/165 /44 /153/5
47% 34% 35% 31%
78/ 151 53/ 17/
165 /44 /153 /54
28% 36% 45% 43%
46/ 16/ 69/ 23/54
/165 /44 /153/5
6 4 6 1
date the complaint was filed against the juvenile in this
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TABLE 4--EDUCATION*
Rest of Rest of
Bergen Trenton Mercer Newark Essex
Average Grade 8.5 7.6 8.2 7.7 8.6
Completed
118 171 48 91 37
No Information 77 9 7 55 16
*Those in ungraded and special schools are not included in this table. Bergen had 5
such students, Mercer 3, and Essex 15.
TABLE 5-AGE X SCHOOL STATUS (% In School)
11 or Less 12-13 14-15 16-17
Trenton 100% 100% 89% 84%
16/ 24/ 68/ 37/
/16 /24 8/76 /44
Rest of - 100% 93% 63%
Mercer 4/ 13/ 10/
/4 %/14 /16
Essex 100% 94% 86% 65%
7/ 32/ 51/ 50/
/7 /34 /59 /77
TABLE 6-AGE X DRUG HISTORY (% With Drug History)
13 or Less 14-15 16-17
Trenton 19% 26% 26%
5/ 12/ 10/
/27 /47 /38
Rest of 13% 20% 50%
Mercer 1/ 2/ 6/
/8 /10 1
Essex 17% 26% 38%
6/ 18/ 37/
/35 /70 /97
TABLE 7-SCHOOL STATUS (% Out of School)
Rest of Rest of
Bergen Trenton Mercer Newark Essex
19% 9% 16% 23% 14%
28/ 14/ 7 31/ 6
/148 /162 / /136 %3
No Information 52 9 3 23 12
TABLE 8-PLACE OF RESIDENCE (% Not Living With Both Parents)
Rest of Mercer Rest of Essex
Bergen Trenton Mercer Total Newark Essex Total
37% 56% 41% 53% 64% 37% 52%
63/ 917/ 114/ 88/ 19/ 110/
/171 V%68 /41 /214 /154 /52 /213
No Infor-
mation 29 3 7 10 5 3 9
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TABLE 9-PARENTAL STATUS (% Parents Not Together)
Rest of Mercer Rest of Essex
Bergen Trenton Mercer Total Newark Essex Total
31% 47% 32% 44% 50% 26% 43%
49/ 78/ 13/ 92/ 68/ 12/ 81/
/157 /167 /40 /211 135 /46
No Infor-
mation 43 4 8 13 24 9 35
TABLE 10-STATUS OF WOMEN
Rest of Mercer Rest of Essex
Bergen Trenton Mercer Total Newark Essex Total
Women 61% 39% 74% 45% 41% - 45%
Employed 46/ 63/ 25/ 90/ 7/17 2/ 9/20
/75 /161 /34 /199 /3
Women 31% 34% 24% 32% 18% - 15%
Unemployed 23/ 54/61 8/4 63/ 3/ 0/ 3
/75 /161 /34 /199 17 //2
Women 6% 20% 0% 17% 35% - 30%
Welfare 5/ 32/ 32/ 6/ 0/ 6/20
/75 /161 34 /199 17 /3
No 1% 7% 3% 7% 6% - 10%
Women 1/ 12/ 1/ 14/ 1/ 1/ 2/
/75 /161 /34 /199 /
No Infor-
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TABLE 12-FAMILY SIZE
Rest of Mercer Rest of Essex
Bergen Trenton Mercer Total Newark Essex Total
Median 2.8 4.4 2.8 4.0 4.6 2.8 4.3
No. of 125 163 39 207 101 20 123
Siblings
No Infor-
mation 75 8 9 17 58 35 99
Median 2.4 3.9 2.5 3.5 4.1 2.6 3.6




mation 83 9 11 21 94 39 140
TABLE 13-DRUG HISTORY
Rest of Mercer Rest of Essex
Bergen Trenton Mercer Total Newark Essex Total
Addictive 5% 3% 3% 3% 15% 5% 12%
6/ 429 /33 %/ 5 17A1 2/ 19/15
Other 23% 19% 27% 20% 25% 37% 28%
Drug 27/ 25/ 9/ 34/6 29/ 15/ 45/
/120 /129 /33 4/166 115 /41 /158
No Drug 73% 78% 70% 77% 60% 59% 59%
87/ 100/ 23/ 127/ 6I/ 24/ 94/1
/120 /129 /33 1166 /115 /41 /5
No Infor-
mation 80 42 15 58 44 14 64
TABLE 14-PRIOR RECORD
Rest of Mercer Rest of Essex
Bergen Trenton Mercer Total Newark Essex Total
Last Adj. 5% 11% 13% 11% 26% 9% 22%
Formal 9/ 18/ 5/ 23/ 41/ 4/ 45/
/197 /166 /40 /211 1/158 /43 5/207
Last Adj. 21% 23% 10% 20% 17% 23% 18%
Informal 41/ 38/ 46 42/ 27/ 10 38/
/197 16 /40 /211 7/158 /43 /207
Last Adj. 2% 14% 13% 15% 9% 2% 8%No Infor- 4/ 24 5 31/ 15 1/ 16
mation /197 166 40 /211 158 /43
Admin. 10% 11% 15% 12% 14% 14% 14%
Record 19/ 19/ 6/ 25/ 22/ 6/ 28/
1/197 166 /40 /211 /158 /43 /207
No 63% 40% 50% 43% 34% 51% 39%
Record 124/ 67/ 20 90/ 53/ 22/ 80/
/197 /166 40 /211 /158 /43 /207
No Infor-
mation 3 5 8 13 1 12 15
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TABLE 15-WORST PREVIOUS DISPOSITION*
Rest of Mercer Rest of Essex
Bergen Trenton Mercer Total Newark Essex Total
Serious 22% 23% 17% 23% 33% 29% 32%
1/ 17/ 2/ 20 27/ 4 31/
/51 4 /12 °/88 81 14 /96
Medium 49% 62% 83% 65% 56% 43% 54%
25/ 46/ 10/ 57/ 45/ 6/ 529/51 /74 /12 /88 /81 /14 52/96
Minor 29% 15% 0% 13% 11% 29% 14%
/51 /74 /12 %8 81 /14
No Infor-
mation 25 30 16 46 25 19 46
* In this and subsequent tables dealing with dispositions, serious dispositions include
commitments to state institutions, or probations with residential or inpatient conditions.
Medium dispositions include all other probations. Minor dispositions include lesser
sanctions such as fines and warnings. Those with no prior record are not included in
prior record tables unless otherwise labeled.
TABLE 16-MOST RECENT DISPOSITION
Rest of Mercer Rest of Essex
Bergen Trenton Mercer Total Newark Essex Total
Serious 22% 19% 17% 19% 24% 29% 24%
11/ 14/ 2/ 17/ 19/ 4/ 23/
/51 /74 /12 /88 /80 /14 /95
Medium 47% 62% 83% 65% 61% 43% 59%
24/ 46/ 10/ 57/ 49/ 6/ 5%5/51 /74 /12 /88 /80 /14 5
Minor 31% 19% 0% 16% 15% 29% 17%
16/1 14/ 0/ 14/ 12/ 4/ 16/
/51 /74 /12 /88 /80 /14 /95
No Infor-
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TABLE 18-CRIME CHARGED*
Rest of Mercer Rest of Essex
Bergen Trenton Mercer Total Newark Essex Total
Serious 6% 7% 4% 7% 24% 13% 21%
11/ 12/ 2/ 15/ 37/ 7/ 46/
/191 /168 /47 /220 /157 /54 /219
Medium 44% 58% 53% 56% 54% 56% 54%
86/ 47/ 25/ 124/ 85/ 30/ 118/19
/191 /168 /47 /220 /157 /54 /1
Minor 34% 23% 30% 24% 9% 20% 13%
66/ 38/ 14/ 52/ 15/ 11/ 28/
/191 /168 /47 /220 /157 /54 /219
Juvenile 14% 13% 13% 13% 13% 11% 12%
Status 28/ 21/ 6/ 29/ 21/ 6/ 27/
/191 /168 /47 /220 /157 /54 /219
No Infor-
mation 9 3 1 4 2 1 3
* Crimes are categorized in the following way:
Serious: Robbery, Armed Robbery, Atrocious Assault and Battery, Possession of
Dangerous Weapon, Indecent Assault, Arson, Assault with a Deadly Weapon,
Carnal Abuse, Possession or Sale of Addictive Drugs.
Medium: Breaking, Entry & Larceny, Breaking & Entry, Larceny, Shoplifting,
Possession of Stolen Property, Auto Theft, Embezzlement, Possession of Non-
addictive Drugs, Possession of Narcotics Paraphernalia, Glue Sniffing, Use
of Drugs, Assault, Incest, Sale of Marijuana, Resisting Arrest, Possession of
Stolen Auto, Escape.
Minor: Drunk and Disorderly, Possession of Alcohol, Auto Tampering, Disorderly
Conduct, Curfew, False Alarm, Malicious Mischief, Loud and Profane Lan-
guage, Trespass, Fornication, Soliciting, Unlawful Use of Auto, Peddling, Lit-
tering, Gambling.
Juvenile Status: Runaway, Truancy, Incorrigibility, Deportment Endangering, Idly
Roaming the Streets, Associating with Delinquent or Immoral Persons, Im-
morality.
A case was categorized according to the most serious charge pending in the case, with
the level of seriousness going from serious to medium to minor to juvenile status.
TABLE 19-POINT SCALE*
Rest of Mercer Rest of Essex
Bergen Trenton Mercer Total Newark Essex Total
Median 1.0 1.8 1.3 1.7 2.3 1.2 2.0
200 171 48 224 159 55 222
* Cases where information as to a particular variable was not available are not sup-
pressed in this data, but simply not assigned a point where information was missing.
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TABLE 20-DETENTION* (% Detained)
Bergen Mercer Essex
Initial 31% 30% 25%
Arrest 58/194 /210 50/203
Subsequent 32% 40% 49%
Arrest 7/22 2/ 34/
Total 33% 34% 36%
Detention 63A/3 70/ 7/04
* Detention resulting from initial arrest arises at the point of initiation of the com-
plaint process. Subsequent arrests led to detention in some cases. Total detention
combines the data in the following way. If the juvenile was never detained it is so
described. If the juvenile was held initially or later, it is described as detention. If
there was no detention in one instance (e.g. initial arrest) and no information in the
other, the case was treated as a no information case.
TABLE 21-DETENTION X CRIME* (% Detained)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
Initial 55% 32% 10% 50%
Arrest 6/ 24/ 7/ 14/
1l 1 /75 /69 /28
Subsequent 33% -
Bergen Arrest /05 1/
Total 55% 37% 10% 54%
Detention 61 31/ 6/ 15/
l1 /83 /63 /28
Initial 23% 28% 22% 49%
Arrest 3 29/ 1 7 1/Ares 13 29/103 12/55 17/35
Subsequent - 37% 57%
Mercer Arrest 1 13/ 4/ 3/
/1 /35 7 /5
Total 29% 34% 24% 54%
Detention 4/ 370 12/ 15/
14 /110 /50 /28
Initial 33% 22% 17% 24%
Arrest 9/7 24/ 5/ 8/
Subsequent 65% 50% 0% -
Essex Arrest 1 20/ 0 2/
Total 53% 33% 13% 32%
Detention 24/ 36/ 3/ 8/
45 1/108 /23 /25
* Crime in this table is tabulated as in Table 19, except that detentions after initial
arrest are tabulated only on the basis of crimes charged at the initial arrest, and de-




TABLE 22-INITIAL DETENTION X REARREST X CRIME*
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
% Detained Pend- 45% 25% 7% 46%
ing Hearing Af- 5/ 19/5 13/
ter Initial Arrest 11 /28
Bergen
% Of Those Not - 18% 11% 14%
Detained or Held 1if 10/ 7/ 2/
Who Are Rearrested /6 /56 /63 /14
% Detained Pend- 8% 3% 5% 20%
ing Hearing Af- 1/ 3/ 3/ 7/
ter Initial Arrest /13 /103 55 /35
Mercer
%Of Those Not 17% 32% 14% 33%
Detained or Held 2/ 32/ 7/ 9/
Who Are Rearrested /12 /100 /51 /27
% Detained Pend- 22% 8% 3% 13%
ing Hearing Af- 6 9/107 10 /34
ter Initial Arrest /27
Essex
% Of Those Not 29% 39% 38% 38%
Detained or Held 6/ 38/ 11/ /
Who Are Rearrested /21 /98 /29
* Those detained are often released pending their hearings. This data reflects that
possibility. The crime charged in this data is the most serious filed during the initial
arrest. Subsequent charges are not included here. (See note to Table 19)







Rearrest 38% 41% 14%
23/ 77 11/2
Rearrest 71% 67% 24%27 8/ 5A
23/ %2 /21
Essex









Prior Record 27% 30%
3/ 25/
1 1 /83
Admin. Record 18% 10%
2/1 
%3
No Record 55% 60%
11 0/83
100% 100%
Prior Record 67% 50%
10/5 58/1
Admin. Record 13% 8%
2/ 9/115




Prior Record 57% 46%
26/46 2
Admin. Record 11% 18%
5A6 20/5/46 1%12
No Record 33% 36%
15/46 /112
100% 100%
TABLE 25-TOTAL DETENTION >
(% Detained)
Last Adj. Last Adj. Last Adj.
Formal Informal No Info.
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TABLE 26-TOTAL DETENTION X WORST PREVIOUS
DISPOSITION (% Detained)
Serious Medium Minor
Bergen 82% 40% 29%
4/9/15 14
Mercer 67% 46% 30%
12/18 2%4 3/
Essex 66% 51% 18%
19/9 26 2/11
TABLE 27-TOTAL DETENTION X NUMBER OF PRIOR
ADJUDICATIONS (% Detained)
1 2 3 or
More
Bergen 32% 62% 70%/28 8/3 7/0
9/8/13 /10
Mercer 38% 43% 58%
156/ 15/
/39 /14 /26
Essex 35% 62% 61%
13/ 13/ 20/
1/7/21 /31
TABLE 28-TOTAL DETENTION X PRIOR RECORD X
CRIME* (% Detained)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
Prior Record 48% 44% 57%
0/ 11/ 4/ 4/
/3 /23 /9 /7
Bergen No Record 29% 4% 56%
14/ 2 10/
%/49 /5 /18
Prior Record 30% 48% 35% 78%
3/ 25/ 6/ 7/30 /52 /17 /9
Mercer No Record - 18% 10% 38%
0/ 8/ 2/ 5/
/3 /45 /21 /13
Prior Record 76% 48% 8%
19/ 23/ /22 / /12 /4
Essex No Record 7% 15% 25% 29%
6/ 2/8/
1/15 /39 8 17
Prior Record 58% 48% 29% 65%
22/ 59/ 1/13/
All /38 /123 /38 /20
Counties No Record 29% 21% 8% 42%
71/ 28/6 20/
/24 2/133 6/74 /48
* Data on cases with administrative records was not large enough to justify its use in
this table.
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TABLE 29-TOTAL DETENTION X SEX, RACE (% Detained)
Male Female White Black
Bergen 31% 45%
























































TABLE 31-TOTAL DETENTION X SEX X CRIME
(% Detained)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
Male 44% 38% 10% 59%
4/ 26/ 5/ 10/
/9 /69 /52 /17
Bergen
Female - 36% 11% 45%
2/ 51 1/ 5/
/2 /14 /9/11
Male 31% 34% 17% 38%
4/34/ 6/ 6/
13 /99 /5 /16
Mercer
Female 27% 40% 75%
3/ 6/ 91
01/1/15 /12
Male 55% 36% 12% 30%
2% 35/ 2/ 3/
497/17 /10
Essex
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Male 41% 19% 28%
16/ 3/ 2
Bergen /39 16 
%3
Female 62% - 28%
8/ 1/ 72
/13 /2
Male 44% 33% 16%
33/ 6 1
Mercer /75 /18 
/63
Female 60% - 25%
/ 5
Male 55% 46% 14%
47/ 11/ 8/
Essex /86 /24 /57
Female - 28%
TABLE 33-TOTAL DETENTION X CRIME XRACE
(% Detained)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
White 16% 23% 56%
5/ 5/ 7/
M /32 /22 /12
Black 30% 44% 25% 50%
3/ 30 6/ 6/
1069 /24 /12
White 14% 17% -
0/5 0/
Essex / 4/24 /4
Black 67% 41% 13% 44%
18/ 27/ 2/ 8/
/66 /16 /18




White 35% 56% 13%'/2o5/ 5/4
Mercer /20 
/40
Black 48% 38% 26%
31/ 5/1/3Y65 /13 10/
White 42% 29% 0%
5/ 2/ 0/
Essex /12 /7 /21
Black 55% 57% 23%
39/ 8/ 9/39
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TABLE 35-REARREST X CRIME X RACE (% Rearrested)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
White 22% 9% 17%
8/7 2/ 2//4/23 /12
Mercer
Black 27% 43% 8% 8%
3/ 33/ 2/ 1/
/11 /77 /25 /13
White 71% 29% 22%
5 % 2/ 1/
/ /8 /9 /4
Essex
Black 50% 38% 6% 5%
1/27/ 1/ 1/
4/28 /71 /7 /20
TABLE 36-RECORD X CRIME X RACE
(% Prior Record)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status




Black 82% 55% 42% 23%
44/ 10 3/
9/1/76 1024 /13
White 14% 32% -
8/1/1
1/ /25 /3 /4
Essex
Black 71% 60% 67% 26%
20/ 41/ 10/ 5/
/8 /M8 1/15 /19
TABLE 37-TOTAL DETENTION X DRUG HISTORY
(% Detained)
Addictive Other No No
Drugs Drugs Drugs Information
Bergen 44% 27% 31%12 2 3 / 23 /
1/ 27 /8
Mercer - 41% 29% 37%
5 13/ %18 1
Essex 59% 36% 40% 24%15 3 0 13/55
10/17 8%/42 / 1%




TABLE 38-TOTAL DETENTION X PRIOR RECORD X
DRUG HISTORY (% Detained)
Addictive Other No No
Drugs Drugs Drugs Information




No 37% 23% 28%
Record 7/ 12/ 14/
/9 /52 /49
A
Prior 57% 40% 53%
Record 12/ 20/ 10/
/21/50 /19Mercer
No 27% 13% 30%
Record 3/ 7/ 6/
/1 53 /20
Prior 77% 47% 50% 39%
Record 10/ 9/ 20/ 7/
/13 9/19 /40 /18
Essex
No - 13% 26% 13%
Record 0/ 2/ 9/ 3/
/4 /16 /35 /24
TABLE 39-DRUG HISTORY X CRIME* (% With Drug History)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
Bergen 33% 44% 6% 14%
3y 2 2/ 2/
/5 /32 /14
Mercer 20% 29% 14% 20%
2/o 26/ 5/36 5/2510o /910
Essex 47% 46% 12% 24%
17 35/6 2/
* Those cases where no information as to drug history was available are deleted from
this table. The table's trends are not altered by that deletion.
1973]
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TABLE 40-TOTAL DETENTION X DRUG HISTORY X
PLACE OF RESIDENCE (% Detained)
Addictive Other No No
Drugs Drugs Drugs Information
Lives with 50% 22% 24%
Both Parents 9/18 11/ 9/
9/18 /50/37Bergen
Lives Other 58% 36% 45%
7// q/
12 10/28 /20
Lives with 28% 19% 30%
Both Parents 5/ 10/ 6/18 1/54 /20
Mercer
Lives Other 67% 38% 48%
12/ 24/ 13/
18 63/27
Lives with - 32% 31% 17%
Both Parents 7/22 12/ 4/3
Essex
Lives Other 45% 47% 47% 31%
5/24/ 8/
11/51 /26




Male 44% 24% 47%
21/ 15/1/32 /89
Mercer
Female - 43% 44%
/4 /28 12/4
TABLE 42-TOTAL DETENTION X SCHOOL STATUS
(% Detained)
In Not in No
School School Information
Bergen 28% 56% 31%
3/15/ 15118 175/48
Mercer 32% 52% 25%
0/75 1/23 /
Essex 35% 39% 36%
4 134 1/3 8 13
[Vol. 26
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TABLE 43-TOTAL DETENTION X SCHOOL STATUS X
PRIOR RECORD (% Detained)
In Not in No
School School Information
Prior 31% 67% 63%
Record / 10/15 5/
Bergen ,9,5/No 17% 44% 23%
Record 22/ 4 7/
/8 /30
Prior 43% 59% -




Record 1 %0 3 %/
Prior 51% 48% 63%
Record 25/ 13/ 0/Essex49 /76
No 18% 25% 11%
Record 11/ 2/ 1/
/12 /8 /9
TABLE 44-TOTAL DETENTION X SCHOOL STATUS X
CRIME (% Detained)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
In School 57% 30% 5% 59%
4/ 16/ 2/ 10/Bergen /54 9/8 17
Not in School 56% 43% /5/ 3 3/
In School 11% 30% 24% 50%
4/ 28/ 10/ 12/
Mercer /13 /93 /4 
/24
Not in School - 67% 1/ 3/
TABLE 45-TOTAL DETENTION X AGE (% Detained)
11 or less 12-13 14-15 16-17
Bergen 40% 43% 30% 33%
4
2
/8 19/ 24/10 /28 19/63/73
Mercer 17% 35% 37% 36%
3/132/ 22/
18 1/31 /87 6
Essex 39% 32% 42%
3/ 14/ 20/ 34/
/36 /63 /81
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13 or Less 33%% 6/8
14 or More 56% 41%
24/
13 or Less - 20%
/5
14 or More 33% 40%
3/ 31/
13 or Less 29% 35%
2/ 8/
14 or More 56% 33%
2% 27/2
TABLE 47-TOTAL DETENTION X AGE X PRIOR
RECORD (% Detained)
11 or Less 12-13 14-15 16-17
Prior Record 43% 48% 45%
310/ 10/o/ 3/ o/ % ,
0/ 7/21 /22"
Bergen
No Record 40% 41% 25% 23%
4/ 7/10/




No Record 19% 20% 18% 24%
2/ 6/ 5/
3/1 1o/34 /21
Prior Record 58% 50% 38%
7/ 137 16/
0%0 12 /6 1/42
Essex
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TABLE 48-PLACE OF RESIDENCE X CRIME
(% Living With Both Parents)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
Bergen 70% 61% 69% 58%
o/10 14%
Mercer 40% 48% 59% 28%
6/5/30/ 8/29
Essex 39% 51% 52% 52%
17/ 58/ 14/2 14/2
/44 113











TABLE 50-TOTAL DETENTION X PLACE OF
RESIDENCE X CRIME (% Detained)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
Lives with 71% 24% 8% 57%
Both Parents 5/3 8/14Bergen /1/4/3
Lives Other - 57% 19% 60%
17/3 6/
1/ /10
Lives with - 24% 21% 43%
Both Parents 0/ 16/ 3/
Mercer %/7
Lives Other 44% 45% 30% 57%
4/22/ 12/
9 55 % /21
Lives with 63% 25% 10% 33%
Both Parents 10/ 13/52 /1 4/
Essex /16 
/12
Lives Other 52% 43% 17% 33%
22%2 4/14/27 5212 /12
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
TABLE 51-TOTAL DETENTION





Lives with 40% 38% 23%Both Parents 1°/53 1/71
Bergen 10/ 
/8
Lives Other 52% - 39%
1/4 1128
Lives with 31% 31% 13%
Both Parents 9 647Mercer9/91
Lives Other 54% 60% 27%
33/ / 0
%6 610 1/3
Lives with 58% 27% 17%
Both Parents 17/ 4 7/
Essex
Lives Other 49% 67% 22%
3 8/2 /32
TABLE 52-TOTAL DETENTION X PLACE OF






Female 25% 54%3/ 15 8
TABLE 53--COMPLAINANT* X PLACE OF RESIDENCE





Mercer 36% 48%5/ 95o
Essex 36% 50%
8/9522 1 91
* If there were more than one set of complaints filed against a juvenile, and the
complainant in either set was a parent, the case is categorized as a parental complaint
situation.
[Vol. .26
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Parental 86% 0% 14% 100%
Complaint 12/ 01 2/
Bergen /14 4 /14
Other 22% 6% 72% 100%
Complaint 40/ 10/ 128/
178 /178 /178
Parental 23% 46% 31% 100%
Complaint 3/ 6/ 4/
Mercer /13 /13 
/13
Other 8% 26% 69% 100%
Complaint 15/ 44/ 132/
/191 191 /191
Parental 28% 14% 57% 100%Complaint 6/ 3/
Essex /21 /21 
/21
Other 18% 17% 65% 100%
Complaint 321 31/8 118/
* Type detention is tabulated in the following way. If a juvenile was detained pending
hearing after the initial or any subsequent arrest, it is so labelled. Otherwise it is
labelled detained and released.
TABLE 55-COMPLAINANT X CRIME (% Parental Complaints)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
Bergen 0% 7% 0% 29%
0/ 6/0/ 8/
/11 %6 /66 /28
Mercer 0% 3% 4% 28%
0/ 4/ 2/ 8/
/15 124 /52 /29
Essex 7% 3% 7% 48%
3 4/ 2/ 13/
/6 118 /28 /27
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Reside Part of Out of
in Bergen N.J. N.J.
Bergen 31% 22% 88%
TABLE 58-POINT SCALE X DETENTION X SEX,
RACE (Median Points)




Not Detained .8 .9 SUFFICIENT
103 25
Detained 2.8 2.1 2.1 2.8
50 18 18 45
Mercer
Not Detained 1.3 1.5 1.0 1.8
113 23 52 72
Detained 3.0 1.7 2.8 2.9
64 8 7 54
Essex
Not Detained 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.8
104 25 35 72
TABLE 59-POINT SCALE X CRIME X TOTAL
DETENTION (Median Points)
Juvenile Total
Serious Medium Minor Status Cases
Detained 1.5 1.7 2.0 1.2 1.6
6 31 6 15 63
Bergen
Not De- - .9 .7 1.1 .9
tained 5 52 57 13 130
Detained - 2.9 1.8 2.3 2.5
4 37 12 15 68
Mercer
Not De- 2.0 1.4 1.0 1.4 1.4
tained 10 72 38 13 135
Detained 3.2 2.8 - 1.5 2.9
24 36 3 8 74
Essex
Not De- 1.8 1.5 1.8 1.3 1.6
tained 21 72 20 17 130
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% Heard within 53% 22% 4%
1 Week 26/ 2/ 4o9
% Heard within 61% 33% 16%
Bergen 1 Month 30/9 3/9 1709
% Heard within 92% 89% 64%
3 Months / 7
% Heard within 0% 0% 1%
1 Week 0/17 0//4 117
% Heard within 47% 13% 16%
Mercer 1 Month 8/ 6/ 19/117
/17 /4617
% Heard within 76% 54% 50%








































TABLE 61-TYPE DETENTION X REARREST
(% Detained Pending Hearing of Those Detained)
Bergen Mercer Essex
Initial Arrest 82% 25% 49%
47 15/ 24/
/57 561 /49
Subsequent 100% 43% 61%
Arrest 7/7 9/21 21/33
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TABLE 62-TYPE DETENTION X CRIME
(% Detained Pending Hearing)
Total
Juvenile Detained
Serious Medium Minor Status Cases
Bergen 84% 87% 84%
526/% 13/ 53/
/63 6/15 /63
Mercer 19% 25% 54% 26%
/6/ 3/ 7/ 18//34 /12 /13 /68
Essex 61% 40% 63% 53%
114/5 2/ 5/ 38/
133 /8 /72
TABLE 63-TYPE DETENTION X PRIOR RECORD





Mercer 33% 11% 20%
/42 'A9 15
Essex 67% 8% 36%
32/ 5/2/4
TABLE 64-TYPE DETENTION X WORST PREVIOUS
DISPOSITION (% Detained Pending Hearing)
Serious Medium Minor
Bergen 78% 100%7/ 1O0o 4/




TABLE 65-TYPE DETENTION X NUMBER OF PRIOR
ADJUDICATIONS (% Detained Pending Hearing)
1 2 3 or More
Bergen 89% 100% 86%
8/ 6
Mercer 27% - 27%4/ 3/ 4/
Essex 58% 69% 75%
12 9/13 5/20
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TABLE 66-TYPE DETENTION X DRUG HISTORY
(% Detained Pending Hearing)
Addictive Other No No
Drugs Drugs Drugs Information
Bergen 100 % 70% 79%
7/16/ 19/217/17 /23 / 4
Mercer 31% 27% 21%5/ 4/ g
Essex 67% 53% 61% 17%
222/6/ 8/15 /36 12
TABLE 67-TYPE DETENTION X DRUG HISTORY X
PRIOR RECORD (% Detained Pending Hearing)
Drug No No
History Drugs Information
Prior Record 100% 78% 100%
Bergen /
No Record 100% 67% 71%
7 8/ 10/14
/7/12/1
TABLE 68-TYPE DETENTION X PLACE OF RESIDENCE X
DRUG HISTORY (% Detained Pending Hearing)
Drug No No
History Drugs Information
Lives with 100% 64% 88%
Both Parents 9/ 7/ 7/
Bergen /9 
/11
Lives Other 100% 90% 89%
/78%
TABLE 69-TYPE DETENTION X AGE
(% Detained Pending Hearing)
11 or Less 12-13 14-15 16-17
Bergen - 83% 89% 88%
2/ 10/ 17/ 21/24
/4/12 19
Mercer 56% 29% 9%
'/2/9/3 /22
Essex - 50% 65% 47%
0/ 7/4 13/ ° 15
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TABLE 70-TYPE DETENTION X PLACE OF
RESIDENCE (% Detained Pending Hearing)
Bergen Mercer Essex
Lives with 79% 15% 41%
Both Parents 23/ 3/ 11/7
Lives Other 92% 31% 61%
24/ 15/ 27/
260 /4
TABLE 71-TYPE DETENTION X PLACE OF RESIDENCE X
PRIOR RECORD (% Detained Pending Hearing)
Prior No
Record Record
Lives with 80% 81%
Both Parents 8/ 13//10 /16
Bergen





Lives Other 33% 33%
11/33 /9
Lives with 56% 28%
Both Parents / 2
Essex
Lives Other 79% 50%
23/4
TABLE 72-TYPE DETENTION X SEX, RACE
(% Detained Pending Hearing)
Male Female White Black
Mercer 20% 44% 22% 24%
1% 88 % %





TABLE 73-POINT SCALE X TYPE DETENTION X
CRIME (% Median Points)
Juvenile Total
Serious Medium Minor Status Cases
Detained - 1.9 - 1.3 1.7
Pending 5 26 4 13 52
Bergen Hearing
Detained - .6 - - .8
and Released 1 5 2 1 11
Detained - 3.0 - 2.5 2.6
Pending 1 6 3 7 17
Mercer Hearing
Detained - 2.9 1.5 2.3 2.4
and Released 3 31 9 6 49
Detained 3.3 2.9 - 1.5 3.1
Pending 14 14 2 5 38
Essex Hearing
Detained 3.2 2.6 - 2.5
and Released 9 21 1 3 34
TABLE 74-TYPE DETENTION X MONTH OF DETENTION
HEARING X REARREST (% Detained Pending Hearing)
No Informa-
tion or No
Jan.-Mar. April-June July-Sept. Oct.-Dec. Hearing
Initial 80% 88% 92% 94% 55%
BergenArrest 10 7/8 11/12 15/1 6/Bergen/11
Total 82% 91% 92% 94% 55%
Arrests 9/ 10/ 12/ 16/ 6/1
/1/1/3 17 /11
Initial 60% 38% 71% 90% 8%
Arrest 6/1 3/8 5/ 9/10 /13
Subsequent 38% 100%
Essex Arrest 3// 4 5/ / /
Total 50% 50% 83% 95% 6%
Arrests 9/ 7/ 1/ 8/1//18 ,14 /12 18/19 /18
TABLE 75-DETENTION X MONTH OF ARREST X
REARREST (% Detained)
Jan.-Mar. April-June July-Sept. Oct.-Dec.
Initial Arrest 29% 25% 23% 23%
10/34 132 12/52 14//81
Subsequent 33% 54% 50% 48%
Essex Arrest 8 /3 11/6/18 3 /10/23
Total Arrests 31% 31% 27% 30%
1% 20/ 17/ 25/
1%265 62 /84
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TABLE 76-DETENTION X MONTH OF DETENTION
HEARING X REARREST X PRIOR RECORD
(% Detained Pending Hearing)
Jan.-June July-Dec.
Prior Record 50% 86%
5/ 12/4
Initial 5/10 1A




Prior Record 63% 93%
Subsequent 
8
Arrest No Record -
0/ 0/
/0
TABLE 77-TYPE DETENTION X CALENDAR
Conference
Formal Informal Committee
Detained Pend- 25% 75% 0% 100%
ing Hearing 13 38/ 0/51
/51 /51
Detained and 18% 82% 0% 100%
Bergen Released 20 9 o/
11 /11/11
No Detention 3% 91% 6% 100%4/12 112/2 7/12
123 /12 2
Detained Pend- 69% 31% 0% 100%
ing Hearing 11/ 5/6 0/16
Detained and 52% 42% 6% 100%
Mercer Released 25/ 20/ 3/
,48 /48 /48
No Detention 15% 73% 12% 100%
20/135 99/135 1635
Detained Pend- 79% 21% 0% 100%
ing Hearing 30/ 8/38 0/38
Detained and 70% 30% 0% 100%
Essex Released 23/ 10/ 0/33
/33 /33
No Detention 33% 63% 5% 100%
1/126 79/1/26 126
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TABLE 78-CALENDAR
Conference No
Formal Informal Committee Information
Bergen 10% 86% 4% 11
19/ 163/ 7/
19/189 /189 /189
Mercer 27% 63% 11% 5
60/ 136/ 3
/219 /219 /219
Essex 47% 46% 7% 6
101/216 100/216 5/216
TABLE 79-CALENDAR X PRIOR RECORD (% Formal)
Last Adj.
Last Adj. Last Adj. No Admin. No
Formal Informal Information Record Record
Bergen 100% 10% 5% 4%4/ 0/2 1/19 5/
/8/0 //1218
Mercer 91% 44% 48% 8% 6%20/ 18 15/ 2 5/88
2 41 /31 /24
Essex 91% 49% 60% 61% 22%
40/ 8 9 1 17/
/37/78
TABLE 80-CALENDAR X PROBATION OFFICER
Conference
Formal Informal Committee
Probation Officer 53% 47% 0% 100%
Assigned 31/ 27/ /8
Mercer /58
No Prob. Officer 18% 68% 14% 100%
Assignment in File 29/ 109/ 23/
/161 10/161 /161
TABLE 81-CALENDAR X NUMBER OF
ADJUDICATIONS (% Formal)
1 2 3 or More
Bergen 0% 42% 78%
o/28  512 /9/129
Mercer 51% 80% 68%
22 12/ 17/
/43 15 /25
Essex 58% 55% 91%
23/ 11/ 31/
40 11/20/34
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TABLE 82-CALENDAR X WORST PREVIOUS
DISPOSITION (% Formal)
Serious Medium Minor
Bergen 50% 29% 0%
5/ 74 0/5
Mercer 74% 61% 18%
1% 3/ 2/
19 54/11
Essex 83% 69% 46%25/ 35/z 613
TABLE 83-CALENDAR X MOST RECENT
DISPOSITION (% Formal)
Serious Medium Minor
Mercer 81% 61% 29%
13/ 34 4/
16 56/14
Essex 82% 71% 47%
18/22 3/55 15







Essex 75% 36%53/1 48/3




Rearrest 70% - 38%2/3 2/ 5/3
Mercer 33 /6/13
No Rearrest 49% 0% 0%
3°/ °/18 0/75
Rearrest 87% 92% 40%
3/11/ 8
Essex 3%9 /12 %0
No Rearrest 58% 38% 16%
3% 6 1/
3/57 /16 %
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TABLE 86-CALENDAR X CRIME
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
Formal 27% 16% 3% 0%
3/ 13/ 2/ 0/
/11 /82 /62 /29
Informal 73% 79% 94% 100%
Bergen 8/ 65/ 58/
/11 /82 /62
Conference 0% 5% 3% 0%
Committee 0/ 4/ 2/ 0/
0/11 /82 /62 /27
100% 100% 100% 100%
Formal 47% 30% 14% 26%
7/ 37/ 7/ 7/
/15 /123 /51 /27
Informal 53% 59% 76% 56%
Mercer 8/ 73/ 39/ 15/
/15 /123 /51 /27
Conference 0% 11% 10% 19%
Committee 0/ 13/ 5 5//15 /123 /51 /27
100% 100% 100% 100%
Formal 78% 48% 19% 12%35/ 55/11 5/ 3/
451 /27 /26
Informal 22% 46% 56% 85%
Essex 10/ 53/ 22/
/45 /115 1/27 /26
Conference 0% 6% 26% 4%
Committee 57/ 7/ 1/
/4 15/27 /26
100% 100% 100% 100%
TABLE 87--COMPLAINANT X CALENDAR
Conference
Formal Informal Committee
Parental 8% 92% 0% 100%
Complaint 1/ 12/ 0/
Bergen /13 /13 
/13
Other Complaint 10% 86% 4% 100%
18/ 151/176 7/
/16 /176 /176
Parental 14% 86% 0% 100%
Complaint 2/ 12/ 0/14
Mercer /14 
/14
Other Complaint 28% 60% 11% 100%
58/ 124/ 23/
/205 /205 /205




Other Complaint 48% 44% 8% 100%
94/ 87/ 15/
/196 /196 /196
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TABLE 88-CALENDAR X RECORD X CRIME (% Formal)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
Prior Record 35% 14% 14%
1/ 8/ 2/ 1/
/3 /23 /14 /7
Bergen
No Record - 6% 0% 0%
230/ 0/
/6/9 /43 /19




No Record - 6% 4% 8%
0/ 3/ 1/ 1/
/3 /48 /23 /13
Prior Record 85% 70% 33%
22/ 35/ 4/ 3/
26/50 /12 15
Essex
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TABLE 90-CALENDAR X DRUG HISTORY X
PRIOR RECORD (% Formal)
Addictive Other No No
Drug Drug Drug Information
Prior Record 70% 14% 11%7/ 3 2/
/10 /21 /19
Bergen Admin. Record 8%
%/ /2 /4
No Record 17% 4% 0%3/1 2/ O/
8 /51 /49
Prior Record 68% 54% 50%
15/ 28/ 10/
/22 2 /20
Mercer Admin. Record 7% 0%
1/2 5A /7
No Record 9% 5% 5%
3 1/21/1, 3/55 1/2
Prior Record 100% 77% 60% 60%
14/ 7 24/ 12/
/14 /22 /40 /20
Admin. Record 47% 67%
Essex 0/ 4/ 7/ S/
/0 /4 /15 /9
No Record - 31% 21% 12%2/ 5/11 7/3 3/5
TABLE 91-CALENDAR X AGE (% Formal)
11 or Less 12-13 14-15 16-17
Bergen 0% 4% 8% 19%
0/0 1/ 64//7
Mercer 5% 29% 37% 21%
10/ 34/ 13/119 10/35 3/93 
/63
Essex 43% 38% 37% 55%
3 1/39 26/ 53/94
3/7 1%/70/9
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
TABLE 92-CALENDAR X AGE X PRIOR
RECORD (% Formal)
[Vol. 26
11 or Less 12-13 14-15 16-17
Prior Record 14% 19% 35%
1 / /21 /20
Bergen
No Record 0% 0% 3% 10%
0/10 1/7 4/41




No Record 0% 9% 11% 0%
0//6 1, 4/ 0/
/37 /21
Prior Record 75% 67% 73%
q/ 18/ 36/
Esx1/1 /12 /27 /49Essex
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TABLE 94-CALENDAR X PLACE OF RESIDENCE X
PRIOR RECORD (% Formal)
Prior Admin. No
Record Record Record
Lives with 8% 13% 4%
Both Parents /'/8 /72Bergen 
/24 8 /7
Lives Other 38%/2 4%
10/ 0/ //26 /5
Lives with 48% 7% 4%
Both Parents 15/ 1/ 2/
Mercer/31 /15 /51
Lives Other 60% 11% 8%
38/ 3/3 1/ 6
Lives with 75% 50% 14%
Both Parents 24/ 8/ 6/
Essex /32 /16
Lives Other 69% 75% 32%
43/ 92 10/1
TABLE 95-CALENDAR X SCHOOL STATUS (% Formal)
Bergen Mercer Essex
In School 6% 25% 43%
/118 /186 /139
Not in School 26% 52% 64%/ 13/ 25/
TABLE 96--CALENDAR X SEX (% Formal)
Bergen Mercer Essex
Male 11% 28% 54%
16/ 50/ 94/
148 /176 /173
Female 8% 23% 14%
3/ 10 G/
/9/43 /42
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TABLE 98-CALENDAR X CRIME X SEX (% Formal)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
Male 33% 16% 2% 0%
3/ 11/ 1/0/
Bergen /9 /69 /52 /16
Female - 15% 13% 0%
0/2/ 1/8 0/
Male 43% 33% 9% 20%
Mercer 14 111 /5 /15
Female - 0% 25% 33%
14/ 4/
Male 77% 52% 22% 20%34/ 52/ 4/ 2/
Essex 44 %9 18o
Female - 13% 11% 6%
1/1 2/15/16




Male 26% 6% 4%
Bergen 1/8 6 e/3
Female 17% 4%
2/2 0/3 /
Male 57% 5% 6%
Mercer 9 /20
Female 53% 5%
Male 71% 67% 27%
Essex %% 6/4 %5
Female 57% 5%
/7 Y/ 22
TABLE 100-CRIME X RECORD X SEX
(% With Prior Record)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
Male 64% 53% 30% 25%
5 4/
Mercer 9/14 /105 90 6/























TABLE 102-CALENDAR X RECORD X RACE(% Formal)
Prior Admin. No
Record Record Record
White 48% 0% 3%
11/3 1/ 0
Mercer
Black 59% 13% 9%
White 46% 57% 29%
Essex
Black 73% 60% 13%
54/ 9/ 4/
/74 /15 /38
TABLE 103-CALENDAR X NUMBER OF
ADJUDICATIONS X RACE (% Formal)

















TABLE 104-CALENDAR X CRIME X RACE (% Formal)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
White - 11% 13% 36%
/4/37/2 /11
Mercer
Black 54% 41% 13% 25%
61 3,/ 3/ 3/
1 1 1/6 /24/12
White 71% 28% 11%
5  82 1/ 0/
Essex
Black 78% 56% 19% 16%
22/ 33/3
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TABLE 106-CALENDAR X CRIME X POINT SCALE
(Median Points)
Juvenile Total
Serious Medium Minor Status Cases
Formal - 2.8 - - 3.1
3 13 2 0 19
Bergen Informal 1.0 .9 .7 1.0 .9Begn8 65 58 27 163
Conference - - - - .6
Committee 0 4 2 0 7
Formal 2.8 3.2 2.4 2.4 2.8
7 37 7 7 60
Mercer Informal 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.6 1.3Mecr8 73 39 15 136
Conference - .5 - .6
Committee 0 13 5 5 23
Formal 2.7 2.5 - 2.6
35 55 5 3 101
Essex Informal 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.2 1.2EIe 0 53 15 22 100
Conference - .6 .6 .6
Committee 0 7 7 1 15
TABLE 107-CALENDAR X POINT SCALE X RACE,
SEX (Median Points)
Male Female White Black
Formal 3.3 3.3
16 3 7 4
Bergen Informal .8 126 1.3 1.1 19 1.8 10
Conference -..
Committee 6 1 1 0
Formal 3.0 2.5 2.6 3.0
50 10 12 45
Mercer Informal 1.2 1.5 1.0 1.5107 29 54 74
Conference .6 .6 .7
Committee 19 4 9 7
Formal 2.7 2.3 1.6 3.0
94 6 16 67
Essex Informal 1.2 1.2 .9 1.573 27 24 60
Conference .0 .6 .6
Committee 6 9 10 5
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
TABLE 108-TOTAL DETENTION X ATTORNEY
[Vol. 26
No In-
Public Private Other No forma-
Defender Attorney Attorney Attorney tion
Detained 12% 16% 5% 67% 100% 5
Bergen 77 %7 /57 
/57
Not 2% 11% 2% 86% 100% 19
Detained 2/ 12/ 2 95
Detained 48% 8% 10% 35% 100% 18
Mercer No/52 42 /52 8%2
Not 15% 8% 3% 74% 100% 45
Detained 14/ 7/ 3/ 67/
Detained 52% 13% 14% 22% 100% 10
33/ / 9/ 14/Essex 6 8/4 /64 /6
Not 20% 8% 8% 62% 100% 27
Detained 21/ 8/ /03 64/3
/103 /103 8/0 0
TABLE 109-CALENDAR X ATTORNEY (% With Attorney)
Bergen Mercer Essex
Formal 100% 80% 95%
1% 4 8%
Informal 11% 18% 4%
17/ 3
1151 17/93 /79




Bergen 96% 82% 82%
40 9/11 1A19
Mercer 94% 98% 91%
16/ /46 1 05/16
Essex 100% 96% 75%
3 ~ 23/7
363 % 4 7/103
* Guilty includes all those who were adjudicated guilty and all those whose dispositions
or adjudications were deferred pending good behavior. This was done on the theory
that the deferred cases must be based on a finding that the court has jurisdiction over
the juvenile (i.e. he or she has committed a delinquent act). Cases administratively
handled (e.g., delinquent cannot be found, delinquent drafted) and pending cases are not
included in the tabulations.
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No Record 96% 86% 82%
23/ 6/ 63//24 /7
Prior Record 93% 96% 87%
1314 26/27 40/
Mercer
No Record - 100% 93%
2/ 11/ 55/59




No Record - 78%
/5 40/51
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Detained Pend- 100% 100% -
ing Hearing 1% 13/ 2/ 5/
Detained and 100% 93% -
Essex Released 7/ 4 3/
No Detention 79% 70% 81% 82%
1 4/ 1% D/
-5/19 7 /16/11
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TABLE 114-VERDICT X DETENTION X NUMBER OF
CHARGES (% Guilty)
1 2 3 or More
Detained Pend- 90% 100% 100%
ing Hearing 19/21 115 13/13
Detained and -
Bergen Released 4/ 2/ 2/6 /2 /2




ing Hearing 64 4/
Detained and 100% 100% 95%
Mercer Released 11/ 14/ 20/
Ill /14 /2
No Detention 93% 82% 95%
64/ 23/ 18/
Detained Pend- 100% 100%
ing Hearing 7/ 6/ 15//7 /6 /15
Detained and - 100%
Essex Released 4/ 2/ 17/
/4 / 71
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Rearrest - 100% 95%
/522/ 19/
Mercer
No Rearrest 92% 96% 90%
Rearrest 100% 100% 88%
15 18 22/25
Essex
No Rearrest 100% 71%
21/ 5/ 55/





Lives with 96% - 89%
Both Parents 22/ 4/ 65/
/23 /5/7
Bergen
Lives Other 100% - 87%
20/ 2/ 26/
/20 /2 /30
Lives with - 100% 89%
Both Parents 3/ 14/ 54/
/3/14 /61
Mercer
Lives Other 93% 97% 93%
13/14 3132 5/4
Lives with 100% 91% 83%
Both Parents 11/ 10/ 40/
/11 /11 /48
Essex
Lives Other 96% 100% 69%
25/ 13/ 34/
JUVENILE COURT PROCESS





Drugs 94% - 87%
/7 /
Bergen




No Drugs 88% 100% 88%
7/ 22/ "/
Addictive Drugs - 100%
6/2 7/
Other Drugs 100% - 67%
8Se / 5 /21




TABLE 119-VERDICT X DETENTION X ATTORNEY
(% Guilty)
Public Private Other No




ing Hearing 86% 86% - 100%
G/ 6 2 31/
/7 /7 /2/31
Detained and - - 100%
Bergen Released 1/ 0 0 7/
81%
No /16






Detained and 100% - - 100%
Mercer Released 18/ 2/ 2/ 12/
1/18 /3 /2 /12
83%
No 1/23





ing Hearing 100% - - 100%
17/17/3557
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Black 100% 100% 91%
11/ 33/ 5/5
1A 33 65
White - - 77%
5 2/ 20/
Essex
Black 100% 95% 75%
.26/ 18/ 44/
/26 /19 /59




Formal 89% -/ 2 0/1
Bergen
Informal 72% 90% 100%
138 121/34 /8
Formal 90% 91% -
38/ 10/ 6/6
Mercer








TABLE 124-VERDICT X TIME TO HEARING X
ATTORNEY (% Guilty)
More
1 Week 8 Days- 4 Mos.- Than
or Less 1 Mo. 2-3 Mos. 1 Yr. 1 Yr.
Attorney - - 87% 75%3/ 4/ 13 9/2
3/3 4/5 '/15 /12
•A
No 96% 87% 89% 86%Bergen Attorney 24/ 13/ 51/ 24/
/25 /15 /57 /28
All Cases 97% 85% 88% 83%
31/ 1/20 66/ 34/
/32 /75 41
Attorney - - 97% 77 %
6/ 29/ 17/
0/ 6 /30 /22
Mercer No - 94% 92% 93%Attorney 26 15/ 38/ /
/0 1/16 38% /28
All Cases - 94% 83% 88%
1/ 32/ 20/71/1 /34 /24 57/65
Attorney 100% 92% 81% 88%
22/ 34/ 7/
% /2 42 8/
S A
No 100% 69% 83%
Essex Attorney 12 / 34
/12 9/13 41
All Cases 100% 79% 82% 88%
20/ 33/ 77/ 7/
/20 /42 7/94 /8
19731
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
TABLE 125-VERDICT X TIME TO HEARING X
CALENDAR (% Guilty)
1 Week 8 Days- 4 Mos.
or Less 1 Mo. 2-3 Mos. or More
Formal - - 89% -
2/ 3/ 8/ 3/
Bergen
Informal 97% 88% 89% 84%
29/ 14/ 58/ 32/
/30 1/16 /65 /38
A
Formal 100% 100% 79%
25/ 19//24
Mercer
Informal 92% 94% 93%
22/ 6711 38/% Y41










TABLE 126-VERDICT X TIME TO HEARING X
DETENTION (% Guilty)
1 Week 8 Days- 4 Mos.
or Less 1 Mo. 2-3 Mos. or More
Detained Pend- 100% 91%
ing Hearing 25/ 21/3
Detained and - 71%
Bergen Released 2 5/
No Detention - 87% 85% 86%
3 13/ 44/ 30/
/15 /52 /35
-A
Detained Pend- 100% -
ing Hearing 7/ / 3/
Detained and 100% 100% 93%
Mercer Released 6/ 24/ 14/
/6 /24 /15
_A




Detained Pend- 100% 100% 100%
ing Hearing 7/7 19/ 10//7/19 /10
Detained and - - 95%Essex Released 2 20/
2 'A /21
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I Week 8 Days-
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TABLE 128-REMANDS X CALENDAR X DETENTION
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TABLE 131-REMANDS X TIME BETWEEN ADJUDICATION
AND DISPOSITION (% Remanded)
Less Than Less Than Less Than
1 Week 1 Mo. 3 Mos.
Remand 27% 41% 86%
Bergen /22 19/
No Remand 61% 62% 71%
72/ 74/ 84/
/19 /119 /119
Remand 20% 30% 40%
2/ 3/ 4/
Mercer 10 /10 /10
No Remand 67% 70% 81%
117/ 134/6
111/6 6  17166  16 6
Remand 30% 70% 97%
Essex 12/2 24/2 31/32
No Remand 78% 80% 85%
82/ 88/
80/163 /103 103
TABLE 132-COMPLAINANT X REMANDS (% Remanded)
Bergen Mercer Essex
Parental 54% 14% 35%
Complaint 7/3 2/4 6/"
Other 11% 4% 23%
Complaint 15/131 7/167 29/126
TABLE 133-REMANDS X SEX (% Remanded)
Bergen Mercer Essex
Male 13% 5% 27%
15/13 %31 3118
Female 24% 10% 17%
TABLE 134-REMANDS X SCHOOL STATUS (% Remanded)
Bergen Mercer Essex
In School 15% 6% 28%
1/9 9  8/138 2%4
Not in School 26% 6% 20%
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TABLE 135-REMANDS X PLACE OF RESIDENCE
(% Remanded)
Bergen Mercer Essex
Lives with 12% 1% 21%
Both Parents 11/ 1/ 13//89 '/68 /62
Lives Other 22% 9% 31%
10/8/ 22/
1/5/91 /71
TABLE 136-REMANDS X DRUG HISTORY (% Remanded)
Addictive Other No No
Drug Drug Drug Information
Bergen 26% 15% 10%7 1 55 0
S A
Mercer 7% 5% 6%
2/29 /96 2/36
Essex 56% 39% 18% 11%
116/ 12/ 3/
TABLE 137-REMANDS X PRIOR RECORD (% Remanded)
Prior Admin. No
Record Record Record
Bergen 24% - 12%
1/ 12/
10/42/102
Mercer 6% 0% 6%
50,4/78 0%8 /4
Essex 31% 11% 23%
22/ 2/ 11/47











Male Female White Black
Remand 1.3 3.2 1.4 iBergen 7z3
No Remand .9 1.6 1.2 2.0
98 22 40 8
Remand 3 4 -
Mercer
No Remand 1.8 1.7 1.1 2.0
125 27 45 97
Remand 2.7 - - 2.8Esx32 3 4 26
x No Remand 2.0 1.2 1.0 2.2
86 15 23 63
TABLE 140-REMANDS X POINT SCALE X CRIME
(Median Points)
Juvenile Total
Serious Medium Minor Status Cases
Remand - 1.1 - 1.5 1.5
Bergen No 9 4 6 2
No Remand 1.3 1.0 .8 1.2 1.0
8 51 44 17 122
Remand 2.2
10
Outpatient Data 1.5Mercer Exams Insufficient 26
No Remands 1.9
140
Remand 2.9 3.0 - 1.3 2.7
Essex 11 14 2 7 
35
No Remand 2.3 1.8 2.0 1.1 1.9
26 52 12 11 102
TABLE 141-REMANDS X JUDGE (% Remanded)
Judge Judge
# 1 #2 Other
Bergen 17% 15% 0%
1/63 1/7 00
Judge Judge Judge Judge
#1 #2 #3 #4 Other
Essex 31% 50% 14% 14% 25%
34/ 9/
1/6 8/16 ~ /21 /28 /30
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Judge # 1 2.5 1.0 1.0
11 52 67




Judge # 1 3.3 1.9 2.4
11 25 35
Judge #2 2.0 1.0 1.6
8 8 17
Essex Judge #3 3 2.7 2.6318 21
Judge #4 1.6 1.8
4 24 29
Other 2.5 1.9 2.0
9 27 40







Informal 18% 15% 0%
1%5 171 0/11
Judge Judge Judge Judge
#1 #2 #3 #4 Other
Formal 42% - 13% 36% 32%
11/ 2/ 2/ 4/ 6/
Essex /26 /2 /16 /11 
/19
Informal 0% 38% - 0% 19%
/ 5/ 1/ 0/ 3/
/13 /5 /17 /16
TABLE 144-REMANDS X DISPOSITION (% Remanded)
Serious Medium Minor
Bergen 43% 22% 6%
6/14 11/51 /84
Mercer 6% 9% 2%
2/33 6/70 1/4




TABLE 145-DISPOSITION X DETENTION X







Informal 19% 13% 3%
/7 1/ 8





Formal 44% 24% 9%
12// 2//27 /7 /23
Essex
Informal 25% 2%













No Remand 69% 24% 11%
/3 10/ 10/0
Remand 64% - 11%
9/14 1/6 19
Essex
No Remand 20% 13% 5%5 2/1 3/
[Vol. 26
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State Inpatient Other Other
Institution Condition Probation Fine Minor
Bergen 2% 8% 34% 17% 39% 100%
3/ 13/ 54/ 26/ 61/57 /157 /157 /157 157
Mercer 8% 12% 47% 8% 25% 100%
14 2 83/ 15/ 44/
17 177 17 /177 177
Essex 14%19 4%91 52% 1% 29% 100%
19/39 /139 2/139 139 41/139
TABLE 149-DISPOSITION X CALENAR
Serious Medium Minor
Formal 31% 56% 13% 100%5//169//162/
Bergen 56 /16
Informal 8% 32% 60% 100%
11/141 45141 154 1




Informal 9% 43% 48% 100%
11/ 52/ 58/121
11 121 /121
Formal 29% 58% 13% 100%
21/ 42/ 9/
Essex /72 /72 
/72
Informal 5% 45% 51% 100%
/ 29/ 33/
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
TABLE 150-DISPOSITION X DETENTION
Serious Medium Minor
Detained Pend- 20% 51% 29% 100%
ing Hearing 12 2 /49
Detained and 13% 38% 50% 100%
Bergen Released '/8//
No Detention 4% 27% 68% 100%
4/ 26/ 65/
95/95 /95
Detained Pend- 59% 29% 12% 100%
ing Hearing 10/ 5/ 2/
/17 /17 /17
Detained and 22% 56% 22% 100%
Mercer Released 10/ 25 10/
No Detention 13% 44% 44% 100%
13/03 /103 /103
Detained Pend- 40% 54% 6% 100%
ing Hearing 14/ 95 1/
Detained and 18% 59% 23% 100%
Essex Released 4/ 13/ 5/22
/22 /22/2



























































































TABLE 152-DISPOSITION X PRIOR RECORD
[Vol. 26
Serious Medium Minor
Prior Record 20% 57% 24% 100%
9/46 2%6 11/ 6
Admin. Record 7% 27% 67% 100%
Bergen / 1/
No Record 6% 25% 69% 100%
61 24/ 66/
/96 /6J
Prior Record 37% 49% 15% 100%
30/82 /82 12/
Admin. Record 15% 50% 35% 100%
Mercer 30 170 o
/2 020 20
No Record 1% 45% 54% 100%
/ 34/ 41/
1//76 /76
Prior Record 34% 60% 6% 100%
24/ 42/ 4/
/70 /70 /70
Admin. Record 0% 37% 63% 100%
Essex 09 7/ 12/
0/19 19/19
No Record 3% 61% 37% 100%38 23/8 148
'/3 8 2%8/3
TABLE 153-DISPOSITION X PRIOR RECORD X




Prior Record 23% - 14%
n/22 '/2 
3/22
No Record 17% 4/ 2  2%
4/40/ '/62
Prior Record 77% 31% 26%
Mercer
No Record - 9% 0%
0/ 1/ 0/
Prior Record 47% 44% 12%
Essex /3 9 /26
No Record - 0% 2%
0/4 09 1/4
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TABLE 154-DISPOSITION X PRIOR RECORD


































































































































TABLE 156-DISPOSITION X CRIME X PRIOR
RECORD (% Serious Disposition)
[Vol. 26
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
Prior Record 18% 9%
Bergen
No Record 0% 3% 29%
Prior Record 25% 38% 20% 57%
2/ 19/ 3/ 4/
/8 /50 /15 /7
Mercer
No Record 6% 0% 0%
3/ 0/ 0/
S/9 9/10
Prior Record 59% 27% 0%
13/ q/ 0/ 1/
/22 /34 /8 /4
Essex
No Record 9% 0% 0%
0/ 0/ 0/
1/11/2%/1
TABLE 157-DISPOSITION X COMPLAINANT
Serious Medium Minor
Parental 23% 54% 23% 100%
Complaint 3/3 73 /
Bergen
Other Complaint 9% 33% 58% 100%
13/ 47/ 84/
/144 /144 /144
Parental 14% 43% 43% 100%
Complaint 2/ 6/ 6/
/14 /14 ,14
Mercer
Other Complaint 20% 47% 33% 100%
33/ 78/ 55/
/166 /166 /166
Parental 18% 76% 6% 100%
Complaint 3/ 13/ 117
/17 /17
Essex



















TABLE 159-DISPOSITION X NUMBER OF PRIOR
ADJUDICATIONS (% Serious Dispositions)
1 2 3 or More
Bergen 4% 45% 33%
/25 11 3/9
Mercer 24% 43% 48%
8/ 6/ 12/
/33 /14 /25
















































































































TABLE 160-DISPOSITION X SEX (% Serious Disposition)
Bergen Mercer Essex
Male 10% 17% 14%
12/22 24/ 16/
Female 12% 31% 0%
/ 0/19







TABLE 162-DISPOSITION X DRUG HISTORY
(% Serious Disposition)
Addictive Other No No
Drug Drug Drug Information
A
Bergen 14% 7% 13%
/9 /72 /56
Mercer 29% 20% 10%
10/35 2/104 /1
Essex 53% 17% 14% 7%/ 5 2/
TABLE 163-DISPOSITION X AGE
(% Serious Disposition)
11 or Less 12-13 14-15 16-17
Bergen 14% 25% 7% 8%1/ 6/ 4/0
/24 456
Mercer 6% 29% 21% 18%
8/ 15/72 10/
1/8/28 72/55




TABLE 164-DISPOSITION X SCHOOL STATUS
(% Serious Disposition)
Bergen Mercer Essex
In School 11% 17% 13%/0 26/51 13/97
Not in School 12% 30% 29%
3/7/ 12/
/A5 /2 3 /42
TABLE 165-DISPOSITION X DRUG HISTORY X
DETENTION (% Serious Dispositions)
No No
Drug Drug Information
Detained Pend- 19% 19% 24%
ing Hearing 3/ 3/ 47
/16 /16
Detained and -
Bergen Released 0 1/ 0/
/0/6 /2
No Detention 8% 2% 6%
2/
Detained Pend- 50% -
ing Hearing 3/ 4/ 3/
/5 /8 /4
Detained and 27% 32% 0%
Mercer Released 3/ 7/ 0/
/11 /22 /12
No Detention 24% 13% 5%
4/ 8/ 1/22/17 /64/2
Detained Pend- 57% 30%
ing Hearing 8/ 6/ 0/
/14 /20 /1
Detained and 29% 22% -
Essex Released 2/ 2/ 0/
/7 /9 /6





TABLE 166-DISPOSITION X PLACE OF RESIDENCE




Lives with 14% - 2%
Bergen Both Parents /22 '/4 '63
Lives Other 30% - 12%
7,4 0/4 3,
Lives with - 21% 4%
Both Parents //3 3/ 2/
Mercer /14 
/52
Lives Other 50% 23% 20%
7/4 7/ 10/
714 7/31 1%
Lives with 36% 22% 3%
Both Parents 4/ 2/
Essex 
/91 /
Lives Other 42% 15% 9%
/24 2, 2
TABLE 167-DISPOSITION X PLACE OF RESIDENCE
(% Serious Disposition)
Bergen Mercer Essex
Lives with 7% 12% 14%
Both Parents 6/9 9/77 9/
2 /64
Lives Other 19% 25% 22%
S 2% 1/72
TABLE 168-DISPOSITION X MOST RECENT DISPOSITION X



















White 18% 25% 3%
2/
Mercer
Black 40% 8% 0%
24/ 1/2 0/40
White 33% 0%3/ 0/4 0/1
Essex
Black 36% 0% 0%
1% 0/ 019/53 /12 /26
TABLE 170-DISPOSITION X CRIME X RACE
(% Serious Disposition)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
White - 19% 0% 0%
1/ %5/ 0 0/
/4 /27 0/18 /8
Mercer
Black 11% 26% 10% 30%
1/17/ 2/319/62 21 1
White 13%
0/ 2/ 0/0/
/5 /16 0/2 /
Essex













Male 30% 7% 2%
2/9 15 %8
Mercer
Female 69% - 0%
2 0/
/13 2/ /18





TABLE 172-DISPOSITION X CRIME X SEX
(% Serious Disposition)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status




Female - 11% - 27%
0/ 1/0/ 3/
/2 1/9 /6 /11
Male 8% 23% 4% 0%
21/ 1/ 0/
1/2 /90 /28 /12
Mercer
Female 10% 21% 50%
1/3 5/ 34
Male 40% 14% 0%
04 9/4 /1 0/
Essex
Female - - - 0%
0/
[Vol. 26
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TABLE 173-DISPOSITION X PLACE OF RESIDENCE X
PRIOR RECORD (% Serious Disposition)
Lives with Lives
Both Parents Other




No Record 3% 17%
2/ 4/
/65 /23




No Record 3% 43%
1/ 15/
/40 /35




No Record 0% 7%
0/ 1/
/21 /14
TABLE 174-DISPOSITION X PLACE OF RESIDENCE X
CRIME (% Serious Disposition)
Juvenile
Serious Medium Minor Status
Lives with - 8% 0% 23%
Both Parents 0/ 3/ 0/ 3/
/5/38 /34 /13
Bergen
Lives Other 8% 15% 40%
1/ 2/ 2/ 4/
/2 /24 /13 /10
Lives with - 16% 5% -
Both Parents 1/ 7/ 1/ 0/
Mece/6 /44 /22 /5Mercer
Lives Other 14% 28% 11% 29%
1/ 15/ 2/ 5/
/7 /54 /19 /17
Lives with 36% 9% 10%
Both Parents 5/ 3/ 0/ 1/
Esx/14 /34 /6 /10Essex
Lives Other 43% 18% 0% 0%
6/34 0/80/9/21 /7
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TABLE 175-DISPOSITION X PLACE OF RESIDENCE X
SEX, RACE (% Serious Disposition)
Male Female White Black
Lives with 11% 18% 11% 11%
Both Parents 7/ 2/ 4/ 4/
/66 /11 /36 /37
Mercer
Lives Other 21% 36% 10% 29%
16/ 2 21/
S/25 1  /72
Lives with 16% 0% 13% 18%
Both Parents 9/ 0/ 2/ 7/
9/55 /9 I1s /40
Essex
Lives Other 26% 0% 9% 24%
16/0/ 1/12/
1/62 /9 1/11 /49
TABLE 176-DISPOSITION X POINT SCALE X
SEX, RACE (Median Points)
Male Female White Black
Serious 2.5 2.5 -
12 4 7 4
Bergen Medium 1.3 2.8 1.9 2
42 13 29 6
Minor .9 1.0 .7
68 16 22 2
Serious 3.3 2.7 - 3.3
24 11 6 25
Mercer Medium 1.9 1.3 2.1 1.769 15 24 55
Minor 1.1 1.3 .8 1.5
51 10 28 31
Serious 3.9 - - 4.1
25 0 3 19
Essex Medium 2.4 2.0 1.5 2.460 12 13 50
Minor .9 .7 .8 .8
34 8 10 22
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TABLE 177-DISPOSITION X POINT SCALE X CRIME
(Median Points)
Juvenile Total
Serious Medium Minor Status Cases
Serious - - - 1.4 1.9
1 5 3 7 15
Bergen Medium - 2 1.5 2.3 1.6235 57 54
Minor .8 .7 1.2 .8
5 27 45 10 87
Serious - 3.3 - - 3.1
2 22 4 5 35
Mercer Medium 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.87 43 20 13 84
Minor - 1.1 .9 - 1.1
4 32 18 4 61
Serious 3.7 4.3 - 3.9
14 9 0 1 25
Essex Medium 2.3 2.5 2.7 1.5 2.416 34 10 11 72
Minor - .9 - .8
6 26 4 6 42




Serious 1.5 2.5 -
7 8 0
Bergen Medium 2.2 2.4 -30 20 4
Minor .7 .8 .7
28 49 10
Judge Judge Judge Judge
#1 #2 #3 #4 Other
Serious 3.8 - 3.5 5.3 4.7
9 2 4 6 4
Essex Medium 2.5 1.8 2.7 1.7 2.517 8 12 16 19
Minor .9 .9 .7 1.0 1.8
7 7 4 8 16
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
TABLE 179-SEX RELATED CRIMES* X SEX
No Sex
Charged Crime,
with Sex but Juv.
Crime Status Other
Male 5% 17% 78% 100%8o 3 140/8
9/80 1/18 0 1A80
Mercer
Female 25% 41% 34% 100%
11 18 15/
Male 3% 18% 79% 100%
6A 31/ '40/7/177 /177 177
Essex
Female 5% 41% 54% 100%
2/ 17/ 22/
/1/41 /41I
* Crime is tabulated here as follows. If the juvenile has any sex related charges, it is
so noted. Sex related charges are indecent assault, incest, fornication, carnal abuse,
soliciting, attempted sodomy, immorality, and indecent exposure. If the juvenile is
not charged with any such offense, but did have a non-sexual juvenile status offense
charge pending, it is so noted. Others are placed in a residual category.











Female 50% 71% 7%
12/ 1/4
/17
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Male 33% 24% 14%
3/ 6/ 15/
Mercer /9 /25 110
Female 27% 36% 27%
3/ 5/ 3/
/11 /14 /11










Rest of Essex 2.3 .9
10 37
TABLE 184-TOWN OF RESIDENCE X PLACE OF






Rest of Essex 11% 38%
3 6/
/28 /16
TABLE 185-TOWN OF RESIDENCE X CALENDAR
Conference
Formal Informal Committee
Trenton 62% 29% 8% 100%
104/ 49/ 14/
167 /167 /167
Rest of Mercer 62% 19% 19% 100%
29/ q/ 9/47 /47 /47
Newark 53% 46% 1% 100%
82/ 72/ 1/
/155 /155 /155
Rest of Essex 28% 48% 24% 100%
15/ 26/ 13/
/54 /54 /54
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TABLE 186-POINT SCALE X CALENDAR X TOWN
OF RESIDENCE (Median Points)
Conference
Formal Informal Committee
Trenton 2.8 1.3 .6
49 104 14




Rest of Essex 1.8 .9 .6
15 26 13









Rest of Essex .8
6 20
TABLE 188-POINT SCALE X DISPOSITION X TOWN
OF RESIDENCE (Median Points)
Serious Medium Minor
Trenton 3.2 1.7 1.2
30 70 43
Rest of Mercer 2.3 .8
4 13 13
Newark 3.9 2.6 .9
21 56 32
Rest of Essex 1.5 .6
4 13 9
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TABLE 189-COMPLAINANT X TOWN OF RESIDENCE
X TOTAL DETENTION (% Detained)
Parental Other
Complaint Complaint
Trenton 67% 34%6/ 49/4
Rest of Mercer 19%
Newark 44% 42%
/16 52/123
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